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Recessions Or Partisanship: What Explains Climate Skepticism in the U.S.?
Abstract
This paper investigates the variations in public mood pertaining to climate skepticism and attempts to
empirically assess whether economic recessions or partisanship help explain aggregate-level trends and
movements across a 16-year time horizon. Public survey data from the iPoll and Gallup Organization were
used to construct the Climate Change Skeptic Index (CCSI) that served as a proxy to capture public
opinion trends in skepticism across the U.S. A two-part vector autoregressive model suggests that while
economic recessions might be causally linked to climate skepticism, partisanship plays a more influential
role in explaining it over time. The key result is that holding all included variables constant, anti-climate
change statements by Republican Congresspersons made three quarters ago raise the CCSI by 0.17
percentage points on average in the current quarter.
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Introduction
In 2006, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler took a year to produce a monumental, 1,652page opinion piece. This opinion detailed the highly sophisticated strategies used by tobacco
companies to deny the science behind the harmful effects of smoking. Agnotology is the
study of culturally induced doubt or ignorance, particularly through the publication of
misleading scientific data. Similar to the strategies used by the tobacco industry, the
evolution of climate skepticism provides an intriguing example of agnotology. Over the past
two decades, the phenomenon of climate skepticism represents the massive gap between the
scientific community’s consensus view on climate change and the U.S. public’s divided
opinion on climate change.
Discussions of public opinions on socio-economic, political, or other stimulating
topics are usually heralded from three types of sources: a perspective that agrees with or
argues for the subject in discussion, a perspective that disagrees with or argues against the
subject, and a neutral perspective that assumes the unbiased stance. One way to contextualize
climate skepticism at an aggregate level is by categorizing and summarizing American public
opinions on climate change. This method assumes that there is such a thing as a “public
mood” on climate skepticism that isn’t static but can be dynamically influenced by other
factors over time. Contemporary research in Political Science usually tends to focus on the
effects of the American public’s partisan values on climate skepticism while controlling for
other factors. The dominating influence of partisanship to explain climate skepticism is so
strongly backed that researchers have even tested it as a “moderating variable” to learn if it
could overwhelm other explanatory factors (Egan & Mullin 2016, 216). Studies by Malka
(2009), McCright & Dunlap (2011), Guber (2013), and Hamilton (2015) have shown that
informational factors such as education, self-rated knowledge, and science comprehension are
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positively related to climate belief for Democrats (and liberals) and vice-versa for
Republicans (and conservatives). Despite the plethora of research focused on partisanship,
others have argued that economic recessions provide a unique, alternative perspective to
understand climate skepticism. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) find convincing evidence that the
onset of the Great Recession in 2008 was an important contributing factor to explain public
opinion trends on skepticism. My curiosity to understand the influencers of climate
skepticism and the debate between its prevailing explanatory factor, partisanship, and niche
explanatory factor, recessions, sets up the key research question for this thesis.
An empirical research thesis can choose to go any number of ways to conceptualize
the relationships between climate skepticism and the two key explanatory factors. I chose a
multivariate timeseries method called vector autoregression analysis to unearth these
interrelationships and find an answer to the research question: “Recessions or Partisanship:
What explains climate skepticism in the U.S.?” Data for the explanatory variables is
relatively easy to find with help from past research and well-developed institutional platforms
like the FRED Economic Data. Computing aggregate-level climate skepticism is a bit more
challenging and is constructed using a novel strategy with inspiration from Brulle et al.
(2012) and the aid of the Dyad Ratios algorithm. I also used existing literature and made a
few subjective decisions on what variables best represent economic recessions and
partisanship. For recessions, I used variables that are often espoused in research and media to
capture the declining state of the economy. For partisanship, I focused on “political elite
cues” similar to Brulle et al. (2012) to understand how statements and voting patterns of
Democratic and Republican Congresspersons could shift public opinion on climate change.
Through the empirical analysis, I find that the effects of economic recessions on climate
skepticism are not clearly discernible for the target period (2000 – 2015). The causality tests
introduced later in the paper indicate that recessionary factors might be causally linked to
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skepticism, but do not provide enough evidence to make definitive claims without further
explication and analysis. In terms of partisanship, Republican (Congressperson) statements
and voting patterns supply consistent evidence to suggest causality and explain the variance
in climate skepticism. Democratic (Congressperson) statements aren’t significant at
explaining trends in skepticism but their voting patterns demonstrate causal effects
systematically and the regression model contributes to explaining the variance in climate
skepticism.
The focus of this empirical thesis is to find an answer to the research question. But
along the way, I’ve attempted to replicate and intuitively understand some of the
sophisticated algorithms and data generating processes to justify using these techniques.
These sections, that serve as a quasi-knowledgebase to demonstrate my learning and
reference for curious readers, are Section 3 and Section 4.1 in the table of contents and can be
skipped by readers only interested in the empirical analysis. The remainder of my paper is
arranged as follows. Section 2 is a Literature Review of other research pertaining to climate
skepticism. Section 3 contains the Methodology Theory that discusses the construction of the
Climate Change Skeptic Index. Section 4 is the heart of the thesis comprising of the
Empirical Strategy that is further broken down into (4.1) DGP Overview that describes the
CCSI and replicates the vector autoregression, (4.2) Applying the Model to the CCSI which
provides descriptive statistics and defines the key hypothesis tests, and (4.3) Data Analysis
that highlights and interprets the empirical results. Section 5 consists of Conclusion, that
summarizes my answer to the research question and explores further avenues for research,
Citations, and the Appendix which hosts supplementary information.
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Literature Review
The business of doubt is not a contemporary issue. Humans have repeatedly used it to
derive economic value and psychological pleasure in the markets and political economy. In
fact, at a micro-level, good parenting involves introducing healthy skepticism into a child’s
mind and institutions of higher education often proclaim their ability to develop contrarians.
Nevertheless, a phenomenon with the scope to create economic value comes with innate
accountability and responsibility to its stakeholders. Big tobacco indulged in such a business
of doubt in the late 1990s and found itself at the brink of collapse when their deceiving
business model was eventually trumped by overwhelming scientific evidence. Similarly,
individuals and stakeholders that witnessed the impending trade-offs mandated by climate
change research in the 1990s, sought to pull out the same stops (sometimes, incredulously,
using the same lawyers as the tobacco industry) and inject doubt in the public’s mind. Powell
(2011) asserts that this “anatomy of denial” isn’t novel and humans have used such
“rhetorical devices” since the time of the Greeks (Powell 2011, 170). One of the fifteen
methods described by Powell (2011) pertains to this idea of “manufacturing doubt” in the
common person. Equating climate denial to a civil trial, Powell states that “a defense attorney
(climate denier) has to prove nothing – only sow enough doubt to weaken the prosecution’s
(climate scientist) case” (Powell 2011, 127).
The scientific evidence for climate change is plentiful and the potential long-term
risks are well-documented. A sweeping threat like climate change is tough to ignore and
finding effective and sustainable solutions should have become the norm since the famous
Charney report, “Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment”, caught the
attention of top government officials, scientists, business professionals, and the public in
1979. Contrary to this expectation, global warming and climate change emerged as
controversial economic and contentious political issues creating a deep divide about climate
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science amongst the American public. Egan and Mullin (2017) observes this divide
statistically and states: “by 1997, concern (about global warming) had dropped sharply
among Republicans compared to Democrats, the beginning of a gap between partisans that
has widened over time and currently stands at more than 40 percentage points” (Egan &
Mullin 2017, 217). McCright and Dunlap (2011) provides groundbreaking insights on the rise
of partisanship and the subsequent polarization of climate change. They explain the growing
polarization problem within climate change with the “party sorting” theory. The key idea
propagated by the theory involves developing friction among party elites on a controversial
issue which results in “party sorting”, i.e. dividing the public and driving them to assume
conflicting positions. McCright and Dunlap (2011) test this theory by using an empirical
strategy comprising of a multivariate logistic regression model to examine Gallup polling
data on climate change opinion from 2001 to 2010 for evidence on three distinct areas: the
political divide on global warming beliefs and concern, the moderating effect of political
orientation, and ideological and partisan polarization. Positioning political ideology and party
identification as explanatory variables and controlling for demographics, temperature and
nine other variables, McCright and Dunlap (2011) finds statistically significant and positive
results to support their hypotheses that “self-identified liberals and Democrats are more likely
to report beliefs about climate science consistent with the scientific consensus (hypothesis 1)
and express personal concern about global warming (hypothesis 2)” (McCright & Dunlap
2011, 170). Furthermore, to study the moderating effect of political orientation, McCright and
Dunlap (2011) utilizes interaction terms that combine party identification and ideology with
educational attainment to verify the results of previous studies on this subject. The analysis is
consistent with the theory once again as McCright and Dunlap (2011) asserts that “the effects
of educational attainment and self-reported understanding on beliefs about climate science
and personal concern about global warming are positive for liberals and Democrats, but are
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weaker or negative for conservatives and Republicans” (McCright & Dunlap 2011, 175). The
concluding part of their analysis is dedicated to answering the question: “Has the polarization
and ideological divide on climate change, tested in the previous hypotheses, grown larger
among the public?”. McCright and Dunlap (2011) relies on another interaction effect, this
time between “political orientation x year” to gather insights on this question (175). The
regression model used to test this specification finds a statistically significant result and
McCright and Dunlap (2011) emphasizes that the polarization trend has grown consistently
over time and state that differences in global warming belief diverged from an 18-point
difference in 2001 to a 44-point difference in 2010 between liberals and conservatives.
The influence of partisan differences on climate change is not a problem unique to the
US as a “meta-analysis of 25 polls and 171 studies in 156 countries showed that aligning with
conservative party ideology consistently predicted climate change skepticism across political
settings” (Egan & Mullin 2017, 216). But, since 1997, the consistently widening gap of
climate change opinions between partisan groups in the US has provided researchers with an
interesting phenomenon to consider. Brulle (2013) asserts a strong correlation between
targeted foundation funding to proliferate climate skepticism. Furthermore, these
conservative think tanks, trade associations, and foundations that form a part of the larger
“climate change counter-movement (CCCM)” are used by Brulle (2013) in the final analysis
that results in “140 foundations making 5,299 grants totalling $558 million to 91 (CCCM)
organizations” over a period of 7 years from 2003-2010 (Brulle 2013, 684). Predominantly,
media coverage and academic literature of the CCCM has been limited to a few key
organizations and simplistic discussion of their activities. On the contrary, Brulle (2013)
approaches this issue holistically and following a comprehensive definition of the climate
change counter-movement, considers questions like, “How are these organizations financially
maintained?” and “How do these organizations and their funders interact to form a social
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movement?” (Brulle 2013, 682). Sticking essentially to a consistent technique of ‘following
the money’, Brulle (2013) uncovers several big CCCM donors such as the Donors Trust
($78.8 million) and Scaife Affiliated Foundations ($39.6 million) and recipients of these
CCCM funds including well-known conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research ($86.7 million) and Heritage Foundation ($76.4 million).
Another interesting link is implied when Brulle (2013) highlights that the rise of Donors
Trust/Capital and the subsequent decline of ExxonMobil and Koch coincides with targeted
environmental campaigns criticizing Koch and Exxon by the Union of Concerned Scientists
and Greenpeace. Literature on the climate change counter-movement is not scarce and
researchers have deployed varying methods to study this occurrence. Jacques and Dunlap
(2008) provides another fascinating approach by performing a quantitative analysis of the
link between conservative think tanks (CTTs) and environmental skepticism. The analysis
involves “141 environmentally skeptic books published between 1972 and 2005” and were
chosen if they “denied or downplayed the seriousness of problems such as climate change”
and eight other categories of environmental issues (Jacques et al., 2008, 358). On the other
end of this analysis, CTTs were identified with the help of the Heritage Foundation’s web
portal that stores a database of other CTTs espousing similar conservative values and were
filtered by using specific keywords to extract the ones focused on environmental issues and
policy. Their findings show that of the 141 chosen books, “130 books (92.2%) have a clear
link one or more CTTs – either via author affiliation (62 books) or because the book was
published by a CTT (5 books) or both (63 books)” (Jacques et al., 2008, 360). Finally, they
scan 50 CTT websites and find that 45 (90%) of them espouse environmentally skeptic
values.
Academic research pertaining to climate skepticism might be disproportionately
focused towards the politicization and partisan themes involved in this matter, but alternate
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theories suggest economic factors could have a substantial say in influencing public opinion
on climate change. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) argues that the impact of the great recession
on public opinion of climate change may have been overlooked; a quick glance at nationally
recognized survey polls from Gallup and Pew indicate that agreement over whether there is
“solid evidence of warming” declined from 77% in 2007 to 57% in October 2009 (Scruggs
and Benegal, 2012, 2). Scruggs and Benegal (2012) attempts an aggregate level and an
individual level analysis of public survey responses to examine the influence of weather,
media, and economic indicators on climate skepticism. For the aggregate level analysis,
survey responses from Pew, Gallup, and Stanford are pooled together as a proxy to measure
public opinion and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model is fitted to observe the
influencers of climate skepticism. The aggregate level analysis showed evidence that weather
and economic indicators, specifically unemployment rate, had a greater impact on public
support for climate change than the media. Scruggs and Benegal (2012) finds that a 2.1 point
increase in unemployment rate leads to a 4-percentage point decline in public support for
climate while holding weather, media, and the consumer confidence index constant. The
individual level analysis utilizes a binary response variable to gather evidence on the
question: “Is there solid evidence that the Earth is warming?”. The authors decide that a
logistic regression model is a better estimator than an OLS with a binary response variable
and include various demographic controls in the model. This model gathers insights on the
extent of partisan influence and states that while climate change belief rates are lower for
Republicans and fell from 60% in 2006 to 38% in 2010, the climate change belief rates didn’t
fare much better for Democrats during the same period and fell by 10 percent from 90%.
Scruggs and Benegal (2012) attempts to raise the importance of an economic crisis and bring
it amidst the climate change conversation without side-lining or ignoring the impact of
partisanship, weather, media, and misinformation campaigns. Finally, further research and
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similar regression analyses on European countries show that public opinion of climate change
in countries with low partisan differences can still be negatively impacted due to economic
indicators.
Scruggs and Benegal (2012) shows that an aggregate level analysis of climate
skepticism is possible, and researchers can empirically assess the societal mood towards the
issue in a chosen year. Brulle et al. (2012) considers a longer time horizon to assess the
changes in public mood on climate change. Here the authors build a “Climate Change Threat
Index (CCTI)” to develop a macro-level measure of the American public’s consensus on the
threat attributed by climate change to their lives. Brulle et al. (2012) tests seven model
specifications using a vector autoregression model (VAR) to assess their influence on the
CCTI. The variables used to estimate the VAR fall into six broad categories: extreme weather
events, scientific information, mass media coverage, media advocacy, political elite cues, and
economic controls. Their research finds that public statements in support of climate change
by Democrats, positive trends in GDP, and New York Times mentions of An Inconvenient
Truth are the three strongest positive predictors of change in the CCTI. On the other hand, the
level of anti-environmental Republican voting patterns and the unemployment level are the
strongest negative predictors of changes in the CCTI (Brulle et al., 2012, 14). In the next
section, I’ll explore various empirical methods available to researchers interested in
estimating and analyzing the aggregate level opinion trends on climate skepticism and
substantiate the approach chosen to find answers to the salient questions posed in this paper.
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Methodology Review
In the literature review, we discussed different individual and aggregate level
approaches to gather insights on climate skepticism in the US. Since this paper attempts to
discern and find empirical results to answer the key question of whether recessions or
partisanship influence the U.S. public mood on climate skepticism, an aggregate level model
inspired by the approach used in Brulle et al. (2012) is the effective way moving forward. An
individual level analysis isn’t helpful since the data sample in such a technique pertains to
individual respondents and hence does not facilitate specific observations related to the causal
effects between macroeconomic factors and the skeptic attitudes of the US public. Scruggs
and Benegal (2012) shows us results from both an aggregate-level approach and an
individual-level analysis. The key difference in this instance pertains to the nature of results
obtained as the aggregate-level approach allows the researcher to present a generalized
argument on how media, weather, and economic conditions influence public opinion about
global warming. On the other hand, the individual-level survey analysis provides empirical
answers that allow researchers to make specific arguments on how the race, party affiliation,
education, income and other key demographics affect an individual’s likelihood of
responding positively or negatively to the global warming question. Hence, an aggregatelevel analysis channels the focus of an empirical study to consensus estimates that provide a
framework to critically answer macro-level questions about climate skepticism in the US.
Though the aggregate-level approach is determined as the best way to proceed, the
researcher now has several options to build a narrative that connects their theoretical claims
to an empirical result. The main obstacle involves finding a consistent and reliable measure to
define the climate skeptic attitudes and capture the altering public opinion trends. A potential
source for such a measure comes from public polling institutions that have collected data on
climate change for many years. Since their target audience (the public, politicians, journalists,
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etc.) usually cares about trending topics and stats of a shorter time horizon, most of the
questions posed through these polls do not repeat and lack consistent question wording over
time. Furthermore, there is considerable disagreement over whether the differences between a
climate change ‘skeptic’ and a climate change ‘denier’ are significant. For this thesis, I’ve
combined them and avoided differentiating between these sub-groups. Herein I run into the
classic aggregation problem, a problem on how to obtain a proxy that best represents climate
skepticism across the US without excluding relevant polling results and including irrelevant
survey questions.
❖ What is the best proxy for climate skepticism in the US?
The rationale behind the shorter time horizon of most survey questions conducted by polling
institutions was mentioned earlier. This is a pertinent problem because independent factors
that could influence climate skepticism need to be analysed over time and contribute little if
looked at through a cross-sectional study. For instance, a key agenda of the paper is to
determine whether economic recessions are causally linked to heightened climate skepticism.
To include a time period with at least two recessionary periods, the proxy needs to capture a
full decade from early 2000s (the dot-com crash) to 2010 (which includes the financial crisis
of 2008). In short, we are looking for a proxy that captures the level of climate skepticism by
aggregating information from relevant survey questions spanning the two recessions of 2001
and 2008.
Simple or Weighted Average: The mean is perhaps the most common measure of center used
in aggregation problems. Barreto and Howland (2006) highlights the pertinence of using the
average as a linear estimator and states that when the “data generating process follows the
classical econometric model (CEM), then the sample average is the best linear, unbiased
estimator” (Barreto & Howland 2006, 346). This theorem, known commonly as the GaussMarkov theorem, fails to validate the usage of the average for my purposes because the
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sampling process and the climate change polling questions do not fulfil the requirements of
the CEM. Among several requirements of the CEM, a key one states that the error terms in
the model are distributed independent and identical to one another. Since the chosen method
involves a time-series analysis, this requirement for the error terms may not hold true and the
conditions of a CEM are violated. The average may not qualify as the best unbiased estimator
for my purported model due to discrepancies to the Gauss-Markov theorem, but I can still use
it as a comparative measure to test the robustness of other unbiased estimators. The weighted
average holds a slight advantage over the simple average in this model since it will
proportionately assign weights to survey responses with larger sample sizes instead of
treating them equally. The advantage arises because larger sample sizes result in smaller
standard errors. But, the average runs into problems and becomes less reliable as an estimator
when missing questions enter the time series model. The missing questions problem arises
because most polling institutions ask questions based on issues that are of current importance
and either change the wording of the question or discontinue the questions over subsequent
periods. Even the same question is not asked every single year. For example, Gallup Polls
posed the question: “Is the seriousness of global warming generally exaggerated, generally
correct, generally underestimated?” in the years: 2000, 2004, 2010, 2013, 2015. Now, if the
chosen timeline for the model extends from 2000 to 2015, the variable representing this
question in the time series will have 10 missing values in its respective matrix. This example
is not an exception as most survey questions measuring skepticism face a similar issue. The
average struggles to perform consistently with missing values and hence might not be the best
proxy for capturing the macro-level estimate of climate skepticism in the US.
Dyad Ratios Method: Stimson (2017) recognizes this shortcoming in using the average as an
estimator of underlying mood based on survey data and proposes the dyad ratios algorithm as
an alternative solution to better estimate the “latent structure” underlying a given dataset
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(Stimson 2017, 5). The dyad ratios algorithm deals with the missing values dilemma in a
creative way that involves building “dyads”, where all the survey results in a given timeseries
are transformed into ratios reliant on other existing values and the resulting matrix is used to
capture the latent structure of the dataset through a recursive estimation technique. The next
section dives deeper into the dyad ratios algorithm and compares its timeseries output of the
polling data used in this paper to the simple and weighted averages. Furthermore, I will
briefly review the Item Response Theory alternative to the Dyad Ratios method and critically
discuss their merits and shortcomings to justify the chosen approach for this paper.
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Stimson’s Dyad Ratios Algorithm
At the onset of this paper, the psychology and prevalence of climate skepticism is
discussed extensively leading to a theoretical case for the creation of an aggregate-level
measure that captures the underlying public mood. The concept of public mood isn’t abstract,
researchers have used it time and again to create generalized dispositions of public opinion to
predict the changes in their theorized model through external shocks. To clarify, phenomena
like climate skepticism might have specific factors predicting outcomes in any given
situation. But there is a subset of unknown, generic factors that underpin the public mood or
latent structure of such issues. For instance, Brulle (2013) mentions the contributions of
conservative think tanks and institutions to fund the counter climate change movement that is
directly targeted at influencing climate skepticism in the US. On the other hand, the
occurrence of an economic downturn is a general trend of a boom-and-bust economic cycle
but may still instigate climate skepticism even if it isn’t purported to influence the public
mood on climate change.
❖ Why was the Dyad Ratios Algorithm created?
On the issue of estimating public mood, another estimation technique often used is called the
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). It is a statistical tool used to compress a large
variable set to a small set while preserving most of the original information. A mathematical
procedure, using a square symmetric matrix, is conducted to transform a range of potentially
correlated variables into a subset of uncorrelated variables which gives the analysis its name
of principal components. But PCA is unreliable in estimating public mood on issues like
climate skepticism because it requires a completed matrix for the mathematical procedure to
work and create a consistent estimation. There is an abundance of data through public polls
on climate skepticism, but the pain point arises due to the irregularity and inconsistency of
the polls resulting in an incomplete matrix. The Dyad Ratios Algorithm was created as an
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alternative to the PCA and contends as a data extraction technique that can estimate a latent
structure while attempting to gauge public opinion based on irregular survey data. Next, I
take a detailed look at the logic of the dyad ratios algorithm by walking through the key steps
of building dyads, implementing the recursive estimation procedure, using an iterative
process for validity estimation and rounding it off with the bootstrapping of standard errors.
Finally, this section will conclude with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
this approach and a quick glance at the Item Response Theory alternative proposed by
McGann (2014).
❖ How does the Dyad Ratios algorithm work?

The algorithm begins with an assertion that changes in survey marginals from one period to
the next indicates changes in the underlying public mood, assuming the chosen survey
adequately captures the mood. In the case of climate skepticism, we have several reliable
survey questions that have been administered by different polling institutions over time. A
rigorous selection process gives us a subset of questions that can potentially capture the
variance of public mood on climate skepticism on a time series. A crucial observation is the
entry of missing survey marginals for questions that are either discontinued or modified over
subsequent periods. To begin the construction of the Dyad Ratios algorithm, I have a subset
of irregular questions that can estimate the latent structure, i.e. climate skepticism, over a
chosen period. Next, I explore the implementation of dyads and lay out the foundation of the
algorithm.
A) Dyad Ratios and Matrix Formation: To simplify the dyad ratios creation, the algorithm
necessitates that all survey marginals are scored in the same direction, i.e. a higher number
indicates a greater indication of the latent structure and vice-versa (Stimson 2017, 8). The
ideal way to clarify the complexities of the dyad ratios algorithm is to create a small example
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that helps us understand the logic and various moving parts. The small example can be
followed along using the “SmallExample-4x4.xls” file. In Figure 1.1, I have a 4x3 complete
matrix with hypothetical survey question items xi, xj, and xk that are administered in Time (T)
1 to 4. Starting with a complete matrix will help understand the dyad ratios estimation
technique when missing values enter the

Complete Matrix
Time
1
2
3
4

xi
30
40
45
50

Question Items
xj
40
50
55
60

Figure 1.1: Complete Matrix

xk
50
60
65
70

equation.
A dyad can be defined as the value
obtained from a ratio of a given item over
any two time points. Stimson (2017) argues

that using dyads to make relative comparisons among survey marginals of different question
items has two advantages. First, the missing values scenario doesn’t impact the usefulness of
the dyads as they are relative measures built using known values of the item. Secondly, with
missing values, descriptive statistics of variables like the mean become unreliable. But, the
expected value for dyads of a given item across multiple periods is equal to 1 and this
improves the consistency of the data used to estimate the latent structure. This relative nature
of dyads results in an exponential growth every time a new question item or a time period is
added to the matrix. Moreover, the recursive estimation technique of the algorithm uses
forward and backward recursion that employs a given item’s value at each time period twice
(excluding the first and last values in the timeseries), the numerator and the denominator
positions of the dyad ratio. Using the 4x3 example matrix, a deeper look into the recursive
estimation process will clarify the ideas discussed above, provide a side-by-side comparison
to contextualize the “best proxy of climate skepticism” debate in the previous section, and
reveal why dyad ratios provide a better estimate of the latent structure than a simple average.
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B) Recursive Estimation: As discussed, the 4x3 matrix results in multiple combinations of
dyads and Figure 1.2 illustrates all the potential ratio combinations using the forward and
backward recursion processes for the items xi, xj, and xk.
Backward recursion

Forward recursion

Ratios xi

Ratios xi
xi2 / xi1
xi3 / xi1
xi4 / xi1

1.33
1.50
1.67

1.13 xi3 / xi2
1.25 xi4 / xi2
1.11 xi4 / xi3

xi1/xi4

0.60

0.75 xi1/xi2

xi2/xi4
xi3/xi4

0.80
0.90

0.67 xi1/xi3
0.89 xi2/xi3

Ratios xj

Ratios xj

xj2 / xj1
xj3 / xj1
xj4 / xj1

1.25
1.38
1.50

1.10 xj3 / xj2
1.20 xj4 / xj2
1.09 xj4 / xj3

xk2 / xk1
xk3 / xk1
xk4 / xk1

Ratios xk
1.20
1.08 xk3 / xk2
1.30
1.17 xk4 / xk2
1.40
1.08 xk4 / xk3

xj1/xj4

0.67

0.80 xj1/xj2

xj2/xj4

0.83

0.73 xj1/xj3

xj3/xj4

0.92

0.91 xj2/xj3

Ratios xk
xk1/xk4
xk2/xk4
xk3/xk4

0.71
0.86
0.93

0.83 xk1/xk2
0.77 xk1/xk3
0.92 xk2/xk3

Figure 1.2: Forward and Backward Recursion Dyads for Complete Matrix

To understand the logic of the dyads, let’s walkthrough a slightly altered matrix which
includes missing values and is a better representation of real survey samples. Consider the
following incomplete matrix in Figure 1.3 below. There are 3 missing values, one for each

Incomplete Matrix
Time
1
2
3
4

Questions Items
xi
xj
30
40
40
55
50
60

Figure 1.3: Incomplete Matrix

item across different time periods. To

xk
60
65
70

reiterate, the recursive estimation process is
a better solution to combine information
across time than an average when missing
values are involved.

Backward Recursion Process:
1. To build the dyad ratios using backward recursion, the first step involves starting at the
final period (T4, in this case) for an item, xi for instance, and building ratios relative to T4
for xi at all preceding time periods (T3, T2, & T1). Next, we further this process by
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moving one time period backwards ([T4]-1 = T3) and building ratios relative to T3 for xi
at all preceding time periods (T2 & T1). This process is repeated until we reach the first
time period (T1) and there are no preceding time periods with item values in the dataset.
Illustration 1 below is a visual description of this dyad creation process for the backward
recursion process. This gives a subset of ratios from the incomplete matrix which looks
similar to the backward recursion table in Figure 2, but now I have 3 missing dyad values
for each item induced by the missing values in the incomplete matrix. The backward
recursion table in Figure 1.4 illustrates the dyads that will be used to complete the rest of
the recursive estimation process.

(Step 1)
Time
1
2
3
4

Questions Items
xi
xj
30
40
40
55
50
60

xk
60
65
70

Dyads created - Step 1

xi1/xi4

0.60

xi2/xi4

0.80

xi3/xi4

-

(Step 2)
Time
1
2
3
4

Questions Items
xi
xj
30
40
40
55
50
60

xk
Dyads created - Step 2

60
65
70

xi1/xi3

-

xi2/xi3

-

(Step 3)
Time
1
2
3
4

Questions Items
xi
xj
30
40
40
55
50
60

xk
60
65
70

Dyads created - Step 3

xi1/xi2

0.75

Illustration 1: Backward Recursion Dyads Walkthrough
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Backward recursion

Forward recursion

Ratios xi

Ratios xi
xi2 / xi1
xi3 / xi1
xi4 / xi1

1.33333

xi3 / xi2

xi1/xi4

0.60

0.75 xi1/xi2

xi2/xi4
xi3/xi4

0.80

1.66667

1.25 xi4 / xi2
xi4 / xi3

xi1/xi3
xi2/xi3

Ratios xj

Ratios xj
xj3 / xj2

xj1/xj4

xj4 / xj2

xj2/xj4

1.5 1.09091 xj4 / xj3

xj3/xj4

xj2 / xj1
xj3 / xj1
xj4 / xj1

1.375

0.67

xj1/xj2
0.73 xj1/xj3

0.92

xj2/xj3

Ratios xk

Ratios xk
xk2 / xk1

1.08333 xk3 / xk2

xk1/xk4

xk3 / xk1
xk4 / xk1

1.16667 xk4 / xk2
1.07692 xk4 / xk3

xk2/xk4
xk3/xk4

xk1/xk2
0.86
0.93

xk1/xk3
0.92 xk2/xk3

Figure 1.4: Forward and Backward Recursion Dyads for Incomplete Matrix

2. To estimate the latent structure at each time period, I consider an arbitrary value of 100
for the final period T4 in our dataset. This is done while computing ratios in the previous
step since I had no available information to equate the value of any item to a respective
value in a time period after T4. Thus, I was only able to use that final time period (T4) in
the denominator of the computed ratios, i.e. as a relative measure for other item values.
Continuing the backward recursion, the next step is to estimate CT-1, the latent structure at
the penultimate period, which is T3 or the T4 – 1 period by using the absolute values for
all items with existing values in T3 and in turn, existing dyad ratios for the T3 / T4
periods. A quick glance at the incomplete matrix in Figure 1.3 shows that only items xj
and xk have existing values for T3. Hence, CT-1 is estimated by averaging the dyad ratios
for all existing item values with T3 / T4 dyads and projecting it based on the final period
(T4) that was assigned the arbitrary value of 100. The calculation of CT-1 is shown in
Figure 1.5, where I obtain the “Avg T4-3” value by averaging the dyads “xj3/xj4” and
“xk3/xk4” and multiply this average with the arbitrary value of 100 to obtain CT-1. At the
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end of this step, I have two values estimating the latent structure, CT which is the arbitrary
value of 100 and CT-1 which is the “data determined value reflecting the true ratio of T
(T4) and T-1 (T3) estimated from all of the existing data” (Stimson 2017, 11). This step is
crucial and justifies the claim that dyad ratios uses only existing values of items and
restricts the missing values from affecting the latent structure estimation.
3. The process in Step 2 is extended and repeated until I have latent structure estimates for
the remaining time periods. In the example, this involves estimating CT-3 and CT-2 to
conclude the backward recursion process. While the averaging process of the ratios is the
same as stated in Step 2, the only difference is that instead of T3 / T4 dyads I am using all
existing items with T2 / T3 dyads and projecting CT-2 by using the data determined value
of CT-1 instead of the arbitrary value of 100 chosen for CT. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until
the backward recursive process hits the first period in the dataset. A final step to finish
this process is to measure the percentage change in the latent structure C from one period
to the next as shown in the “Latent C (% change)” column in Figure 1.5. This is done to
transform the latent C obtained by the dyad ratios algorithm into a comparable form to the
latent C estimated by a simple average. Since the estimation technique involves averaging

Backward recursion
Average ratios
(across xi, xj, xk)

Ratios xi

Time

Latent C
Latent C (% change)

xi1/xi4

0.60

0.75 xi1/xi2

Avg T4-1

0.633

0.750 Avg T2-1

1

63.874

33.3%

xi2/xi4

0.80

xi1/xi3

Avg T4-2

0.829

0.727 Avg T3-1

2

85.165

8.3%

xi2/xi3

Avg T4-3

0.923

0.923 Avg T3-2

3

92.262

8.4%

xi3/xi4
Ratios xj
xj1/xj4

0.67

100

xj1/xj2

xj2/xj4
xj3/xj4

4
0.73 xj1/xj3

0.92

xj2/xj3

Not using ratios marked in yellow:
T4-1, T4-2, & T3-1

CT-1 = Avg T4-3 x CT
(100)

Ratios xk
xk1/xk4
xk2/xk4
xk3/xk4

xk1/xk2
0.86
0.93

CT-2 = Avg T3-2 x CT-1

xk1/xk3
0.92 xk2/xk3

Figure 1.5: Complete Walkthrough of Backward Recursion Process
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dyad values and projecting them relative to other time periods, the latent C needs to be
interpreted as percent changes rather than an absolute level.
Forward Recursion Process:
Once the backward recursion process is understood, the forward recursion process is simple
to understand. Steps 1, 2 and 3 from the backward recursion process are mirrored and
tweaked to build the dyad ratios, averaging the existing dyads, and projecting the latent
structure. Here, I note only the key differences when implementing the following steps for the
forward recursion process and Figure 1.6 and Illustration 2 will serve as visual guides for the
process.

(Step 1)
Time
1
2
3
4

Questions Items
xi
xj
30
40
40
55
50
60

xk
60
65
70

Dyads created - Step 1

xi2/xi1

1.33

xi3/xi1

-

xi4/xi1

1.6666667

(Step 2)
Time
1
2
3
4

Questions Items
xi
xj
30
40
40
55
50
60

xk
60
65
70

Dyads created - Step 2

xi3/xi2

-

xi4/xi2

1.25

(Step 3)
Time
1
2
3
4

Questions Items
xi
xj
30
40
40
55
50
60

xk
60
65
70

Dyads created - Step 3

xi4/xi3

-

Illustration 2: Forward Recursion Dyads Walkthrough

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol16/iss1/9

22

Sambatur: What Explains Climate Skepticism in the US?

1. In contrast to the backward recursion, the first step here involves starting at the first period
(T1) for an item, xi for instance, and building ratios relative to T1 for xi at all successive
periods (T2, T3, & T4). Next, we continue the process by moving one period forward ([T1] +
1 = T2) and building ratios relative to T2 for xi at all successive periods (T3 & T4). This
process is repeated until the final period (T4). The results of the dyad ratios creation for all
items can be seen in the forward recursion table in Figure 1.4. Once again, the effect of the
initial missing values is evident as the resulting subset of ratios is similar to the forward
recursion table in Figure 1.2 but features 3 missing values for each item.
2. The averaging process for forward recursion mirrors the one used in the backward
recursion. But instead of starting with the final period, the forward recursion begins with an
arbitrary value (100) at the first period (T1) and moves forward in time. Thus CT+1, the latent
structure at the T2 period, is estimated by using the absolute values for all items with existing
values at T2 and in turn, existing dyad ratios for the T2 / T1 periods. Figure 1.6 shows the
calculation of the averages for all items with existing values and how these averages are used
in projecting the forward recursive estimates of the latent structure at all time periods, CT+1,
CT+2 and CT+3. The percentage change of the latent structure over subsequent periods is
shown in the column “Latent C (%change)” in Figure 1.6 and the formula is reversed to
reflect the earlier periods starting with CT (T1) as the initial number. Stimson (2017)
highlights another important quality of the Dyad Ratios when he says “When using backward
recursion later periods tend to dominate the solution. Forward recursion has the reverse
weighting of backward, earlier items contribute more to the solution than do later ones”
(Stimson 2017, 11).
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Forward recursion
Average ratios
(across x i, xj, xk)

Ratios xi
xi2 / xi1

1.33333

xi3 / xi1
xi4 / xi1

1.66667

xi3 / xi2

Avg T1-2

1.333333 1.083333 Avg T2-3

1

1.25 xi4 / xi2

Avg T1-3

1.375 1.208333 Avg T2-4

2 133.333

33.3%

xi4 / xi3

Avg T1-4

1.583333 1.083916 Avg T3-4

3 144.444

8.3%

4 156.566

8.4%

Ratios xj
xj2 / xj1
xj3 / xj1
xj4 / xj1

Latent C
Latent C (% change)

Time

100

xj3 / xj2
1.375

xj4 / xj2

1.5 1.09091 xj4 / xj3

Not using ratios marked in yellow:

CT+1 = Avg T1-2 x CT

T1-3, T1-4, & T2-4

(100)

Ratios xk
xk2 / xk1

1.08333 xk3 / xk2

xk3 / xk1
xk4 / xk1

1.16667 xk4 / xk2
1.07692 xk4 / xk3

CT+2 = Avg T2-3 x CT+1
(100)

Figure 1.6: Complete Walkthrough of Forward Recursion Process

Consolidated Latent Structure Estimate:
The final step in the Recursive Estimation process involves averaging the Forward and
Backward recursive estimates of the latent structure, “CF and CB”, calculated in Figure 1.5
and Figure 1.6. Stimson (2017) notes that the first advantage of averaging CF and CB stems
from using all the available information from the question items transformed into their
respective dyads and avoiding the pitfalls of adverse selection. Furthermore, the averaging of
CF and CB tackles the differences in weights produced by the backward and forward
recursions discussed previously and gives the user a single summary score that balances the
weights of the earlier and later periods in the dataset.
❖ Is this a holistic description of the Dyad Ratios algorithm?

The motive behind this section is not to replicate every single step and provide an exact
description of the dyad ratios algorithm. The algorithm doesn’t end with the recursive
estimation process discussed above as it involves three more stages that Stimson (2017)
explains in more precise terms. I focus on the recursive estimation process and describe it in
greater detail with an example as it signifies the crux of the algorithm. At most, the recursive
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estimation exposition provided here is a simplified version of the dyad ratios’ true formula to
capture the spirit of the algorithm and rationalize its use in constructing the Climate Change
Skeptic Index. The three additional stages carried out by the software package (Wcalc) that
supports the dyad ratios are:
1) Smoothing: Stimson (2017) argues that in combining the forward and backward recursive
estimates (CF and CB), a smoothed approximation is better than data-determined estimates
which have sampling error baked into their estimation process. The chosen model for the
dyad ratios algorithm is an exponential smoothing model of the form: yt =αxt + (1−α) xt −1.
2) Validity Estimation: During the recursive estimation, I assumed without proof that the
items included in the dyad ratios to estimate the latent structure are valid indicators of it.
Stimson (2017) suggests there are three alternatives for validity estimation: assuming perfect
validity, estimating from the R2 of multiple regressions of an item as dependent on all other
items, and iterative estimation. Stimson (2017) uses the iterative estimation approach that
essentially creates a weighted average for the dyad ratios at each time point using their
validity estimates “μi2 ” as the weights. The validity estimates for each item i (μi2), is the
amount of variance shared between the item and the latent structure. Stimson (2017) notes
that the iterative solution for this process is obtained when the difference in the μi2 between
past and present iterations differs by less than .001. Based on the theory of vector
decomposition, Stimson (2017) argues that if the true values of the μi2 were known, then we
can state that the squared correlation between the latent structure and the item would be equal
to μi2. Thus, by comparing the squared correlations between the latent structure and each item
for all N, and verifying that they differ by a small amount (.001) across time, we can build an
iterative solution to gauge the respective item’s validity and use it as a weight to estimate the
respective dyad ratio.
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3) Bootstrapping Errors: The need for bootstrapping arises from the lack of readily available
standard errors automatically generated by the estimator. Stimson (2017) asserts that
bootstrapping is empirically a “second best” alternative than other options and espouses its
statistical foundation when he states “the fundamental idea of bootstrapping is that we can
subject the estimator to variation of known magnitude in data input and then observe its
behavior” (Stimson 2017, 16). The inferred variations in data input improves with the number
of observations and is simply a protracted description for the standard deviation of the
distribution.
❖ Alternative estimators and the rationale for using Dyad Ratios:
In the Methodology section, I briefly contrasted the dyad ratios with the simple and weighted
averages as tools to build the potential proxy for climate skepticism. Despite the reproduction
of the recursive estimation process of the Dyad Ratios in this section, there are several
elements of the algorithm that I failed to replicate on excel. This inability to replicate every
aspect of the Dyad Ratios algorithm on a spreadsheet layout renders its black box qualities
and raises questions about its applicability for estimating the latent structure of climate
skepticism. The graphs in Figure 1.8 are a crucial first step to justify the use of Dyad Ratios.
Figure 1.8 plots the timeseries estimates of the latent structure of climate skepticism varying
from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 provided by the three estimators I’ve already discussed. The
Climate Change Skeptic Index (CCSI) is a name inspired by the Climate Change Threat
Index created by Brulle et al. (2012) and will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section. The actual survey data used in the empirical analysis section of the paper was used to
create a simple average estimate, weighted average estimate, and a dyad ratios estimate. The
simple and weighted averages were created on an excel sheet using simple INDEX &
MATCH functions to filter the survey questions by year, average all the marginals and adjust
their weights by the sample size. For the dyad ratios estimation, a software package called
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Wcalc (described in the CCSI section) was used to produce the timeseries. Coming back to
Figure 8, this side-by-side comparison with the averages provides an initial screening and
shows that the data generating process of the dyad ratios is consistent and produces close

CCSI Comparison - Dyad Ratios Vs Averages
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
35%

35%

30%

30%

25%

25%

20%

20%

15%

15%

10%

10%

5%

5%

0%

0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Dyad Ratios

Simple Average

Weighted Average

Figure 1.8: Dyad Ratios Justification

estimates to the average. Next, I look at an Item Response Theory alternative to build the
latent structure and conclude with the rationale for sticking with the Dyad Ratios algorithm.
❖ McGann’s Item Response Theory and Criticism of the Dyad Ratios
Item Response Theory (IRT) models have been a standard method used predominantly in the
field of psychology but have found particular use cases in contemporary political science
research. IRT was considered an important innovation for researchers in psychometrics as it
provided an alternative for the Classical Test Theory and captured the interactions between
survey items and individual-level responses in a similar manner as probit regression models.
Implementing an IRT model allows the researcher to render an S-shaped curve to analyze
dichotomous items using estimation techniques like maximum likelihood and other Bayesian
methods. Despite these use cases, McGann (2013) highlights the fact that most of the existing
IRT approaches only work with individual-level response and cannot be applied to aggregate
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level data in the same way as the Dyad Ratios algorithm. Next, I briefly discuss McGann’s
IRT approach that can deal with aggregate level data and describe his criticisms of the Dyad
Ratios algorithm.
IRT Model of Policy Mood: Unlike the Dyad Ratios algorithm, McGann’s IRT approach
assumes item validity, i.e. the items chosen by the researcher to estimate the latent structure
(or mood) are assumed to be valid indicators. Beginning with this assumption, the model
states that there is a probability function to assess the respondent’s answer and categorize it
as “correct” (for instance - estimating climate skepticism, correct would equate to answering
as a skeptic). Next, each question has two parameters: difficulty and discrimination that affect
the probability of the correct response. The parameters instigate the variations in the
probability of the correct response and McGann (2013) explains that if the variable
measuring the position of the respondent is greater than the difficulty parameter, the
probability of a correct response is greater than 0.5. Similarly, a low discrimination parameter
coupled with a respondent’s greater ability to answer a question correctly (i.e. the
respondent’s position variable > difficulty parameter) will render a probability that is closer
to 1. Figure 1.9 below depicts the varying probabilities of answering correctly captured by
three question items. McGann (2013) uses this foundation to develop the IRT model, run
other mathematical transformations to improve the estimation results and implements it using
a Bayesian inference software such as JAGS or BUGS (McGann 2013, 120).
Criticism of Dyad Ratios: The main criticism of the Dyad Ratios by McGann (2013) relates
to the apparent “asymmetry” between dyad ratios due to differences induced by choosing the
left-wing (or non-skeptical) responses versus right-wing (or skeptical) responses as the object
of the ratio. McGann (2013) uses this example to show that a shift from 20% to 60% gives a
ratio of 1:3 but a shift from 80% to 60% gives a ratio of 4:3. This might not be the best
representation of the relative changes in policy mood. There is a concession that the problem
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could be mitigated by the Dyad ratio algorithm as it repeatedly “reweights items based on
commonalities”, meaning it verifies the weight of each question item by its ability to indicate
the latent structure.
Stimson’s Defence of Dyad Ratios: Stimson (2017) doesn’t directly address the concerns
raised by McGann (2013) but implies that the comparison between the IRT and Dyad Ratios
might not be a point-by-point comparison since it’s a case where both the mathematical
model and the input data of the approaches vary. But, Stimson (2017) shows that the latent
structure estimates produced by both Dyad Ratios and IRT converge and hence can be used
to model the empirical approach for similar purposes.
The observed differences between the two approaches and the criticisms of the Dyad Ratios
algorithm do not discourage its use case for this paper. The marginal benefits stemming from
McGann’s IRT code, deciphering and implementing it for this empirical study do not
supersede its incremental costs. The Dyad Ratios provides a convenient way of building a
consistent latent structure estimate using the Wcalc software and helps achieve the key
agenda of evaluating trends by running regression analyses. Ideally, I would have liked to
demystify the “black-box nature” of certain components in the Dyad Ratios algorithm and
replicate it perfectly. But the rational approach is to consider the scope of this academic
paper, the opportunity costs involved in exploring the IRT (or other valid methods) and make
the pertinent trade-off for the greater good.
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Empirical Strategy
The crux of every serious claim made in this research paper rests on the clarity of the
empirical strategy. Theoretically, the key goals of the paper are straightforward. I’ve
discussed a few broad ideas involving the existence of an aggregate-level measure of climate
skepticism and refer to contemporary literature to theorize the potential factors that influence
this phenomenon over time. Empirically, the agenda is manifold but can be summarized into
five overarching stages: 1) to build this aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism in a
logical and realistic manner, 2) to find the best way to combine this measure analytically with
data pertaining to the key explanatory variables, 3) to assess the quality of the results
obtained from the model, 4) to interpret the results and contextualize them within the project
definition and 5) to critically discuss the implications of the findings by making focused,
statistically justified observations about the factors explaining climate skepticism. To tackle
this agenda, the empirical section will be divided into three sub-sections. First, I examine the
data generation process (DGP) that renders the Climate Change Skeptic Index (CCSI), the
aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism in the US. This part also discusses the wellknown multivariate time series model, vector autoregression (VAR), which will be used to
study the relationships between the CCSI and variables representing recessionary economic
factors and partisanship. The second sub-section will take a comprehensive look at all the
data used in the analysis and state the various hypotheses tests that will be assessed through
the VAR. Lastly, I conclude with an interpretation and discussion of the results to address the
key takeaways from the analysis.
❖ DGP: Climate Change Skeptic Index
During the ideation phase of this paper, the intent was to test empirical claims of factors
influencing public opinion on climate change in the US. Further exploration led to
discovering extensive literature on the culture of climate skepticism. Initially, as I
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brainstormed plausible ways of formulating a thesis from these intriguing ideas, the task of
building an aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism seemed insurmountable. But this
persistent search for plausible estimators of climate skepticism led to the climate change
threat index (CCTI) (Brulle et al., 2012). The inspiration and guidance for formulating the
CCSI came directly from Brulle et al. (2012) and the methodology used to create the CCTI.
In the Stimson Algorithm section, I explored the underlying dyad ratios method that directs
the process of the Wcalc program. Here I will discuss the stylistic elements of the data used
to build the CCSI, including the criterion used to qualify survey questions for the index and
their respective descriptive stats.

Climate Change Skeptic Index
(recessions and key political events)
35%
30%

25%
20%
15%
10%

5%
0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Recession Periods

CCSI

CCSI Construction and General Facts: The raw survey data for the CCSI was gathered from
two different sources and merged into one master dataset to ease the recoding process needed
to meet the requirements of the Wcalc program. The first source was the iPoll+ database
hosted by Cornell University’s Roper Center. The Roper Center is home to a vast amount of
public opinion data collected from prominent polling institutions such as Pew, Gallup, NY
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Times, etc. A database search with the keywords “climate change”, “global warming”, and
“greenhouse” yielded a total of 268 questions for the timeline filter: 1st January 2000 – 31st
December 2015. Next, I manually verified these 268 questions to exclude all items irrelevant
to the construction of the CCSI. The manual selection was verified multiple times to
maximize the effort to avoid human error and bias. To standardize the selection process, I
established two broad screening categories to ensure that questions related to these themes
made it into the CCSI. The first category captured questions on climate skepticism and was
further divided into three sub-categories. 1) “Belief”- these types of questions test whether
the respondent simply believes that climate change/global warming is real/occurring. 2)
“Science” – these types of questions test whether the respondent disagrees with the scientific
consensus on climate change or disputes basic scientific facts. 3) “Attitude” – these types of
questions attempt to gauge the respondent’s attitude towards climate change and check for
skeptic/denial responses to questions about climate change action. The second category
includes slightly tougher questions related to the nature of the cause of climate change.
Essentially, this category aims to capture questions that test the respondent’s belief that
climate change (or global warming) is not anthropogenic, i.e. not caused by human activities
and attributed to natural changes. Another critical decision involved determining which
survey marginal responses to include in the formulation of the CCSI for the relevant
questions. Most questions had approximately five responses along these lines: strongly agree,
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree. Based on the question
content, the survey marginals (percentage of total respondents choosing a particular option)
of both positive (“strongly agree” and “agree”) or negative (“strongly disagree” and
“disagree”) responses were combined to record the respective item’s skeptic response value.
This question-filtering process from the first source resulted in a dataset with 101 total
question items coming from 69 unique questions. 18 polling organizations asked these
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questions for the target period of Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 and the dataset has a sample size of
115,355 respondents. Though the iPoll+ database hosted questions from the Gallup
organization, I was able to find 8 other questions related to climate skepticism on their
official website which matched the selection criterion. These questions were re-coded in a
similar manner and the resulting dataset consisted of 85 total questions from the 8 unique
questions administered to 84,000 respondents for the target time period. After combining
these two datasets, we are ready to use the Wcalc program to create the CCSI.
Basic Instructions - Wcalc Program: The Wcalc program was created by James Stimson for
researchers to input data and build a timeseries latent estimate based on his Dyad Ratios
algorithm. Wcalc is very specific on how it reads the input file and essentially requires all
data classified into four categories: 1) Date, 2) Variable Name, 3) Marginal Score, and 4)
Sample Size. The raw dataset from iPoll+ already provides three of the four filters for the
data and I already explained how the remaining one (survey marginals) was built. An
extensive documentation of how to use Wcalc has been provided by the author, Stimson
(2017). Table S2 and S3 in the Appendix provides descriptive stats like the mean and standard
deviation for the questions inputted into Wcalc. A comprehensive list including full text of
chosen questions, polling organization, CCSI Iteration History by Wcalc, etc. can be found in
the Appendix as well. As a reminder, Table S3 only shows 19 questions since the dyad ratios
algorithm requires a minimum repetition of 2 cases over the chosen time period.
Now that we have understood the process and steps involved in the construction of the
CCSI, we take a deeper look at the data generating process of the VAR model. I believe that
understanding the data generating process is an essential precursor to reliably interpret the
results of the empirical model and confidently discuss the findings.
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❖ DGP: Vector Autoregression Model

I have previously mentioned that the methodology used in Brulle (2012) was a big inspiration
for the empirical strategy of this paper. But prior to making the decision of using a VAR
model, I researched other ways to model the key theoretical questions about climate
skepticism. Some of the alternative empirical strategies were discussed in the literature
review. The closest alternative idea was to run simple OLS or logit regression analyses
immediately before and after recession periods to study its impact on climate skepticism. A
drawback of this approach is that it fails to account for past periods of variables influencing
current period estimates. This is especially important when considering that recessionary
effects might take time to impact people’s lives and public opinion on issues like climate
change are never static. Another drawback comes from the inability to account for
uncertainty with respect to the nature of the variables included in the model, i.e. whether a
certain variable and all previous period estimates of it are truly exogenous to the specified
model. The VAR system mitigates these problems and turns out to be a valuable tool in
analyzing variations in climate skepticism over longer periods of time. The natural question
to consider is: “What is a VAR and what does it mean?”. Our work in this section is not to
simply restate definitions and equations that can be easily found elsewhere. I will strive to
provide an explicit answer to this question while being cognizant of the layperson’s needs
and the scope of this paper. For this purpose, the VAR model can be broken down into five
steps: 1) model specification, 2) pre-estimation steps, 3) estimation of VAR, 4) postestimation causality steps, and 5) post-estimation diagnostics. My focus will be on the first
three steps to ensure there is sufficient clarity. The final two steps are important but have
been covered extensively by academics and are done mostly to analyze the relevance of our
results and gain confidence on the estimations.
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1. Model Specification
The VAR system is often chosen when researchers are not sure of the exogeneity of the
included variables in the model. For instance, one set of variables used in this paper pertain to
media coverage of climate change. There is no discernible way to say that environmental and
conservative magazine articles are strictly exogenous, i.e. are independent and unaffected by
current levels and past values of other variables in the model. To help understand and
walkthrough the rest of the VAR model, I will use a variable subset from the main data as a
guide for the rest of this section. Readers can follow along using the “Stata VAR
Excelification.xlsx” and “VAR Excelification (dead).xlsx” files. A bivariate third-order
model consisting of unemployment rate (y) and the CCSI (z) will be used for reference. The
“’AR” part of the VAR model stands for “autoregressive” or variables that can be influenced
by past values of their own sequence. The “third-order” simply indicates the number of lags
(3) that will be included in the model. The number of lags refers to how many previous
periods of the variables will be included in the model. Since all variables in the VAR model
are endogenous, they will each appear on the left-hand side of the equation once and will be
estimated at current levels (i.e. time, t) by regressing past realizations of their own values (3
lags = t-1, t-2, t-3) and past and current realizations of other included variables in the system.

VAR (3rd Order Model):
yt (unemployment) = a10+ a11.yt-1 + a12.yt-2 + a13.yt-3 + a14.zt-1 + a15.zt-2 + a16.zt-3 + e1t
zt (CCSI) = a20 + a21.yt-1 + a22.yt-2 + a23.yt-3 + a24.zt-1 + a25.zt-2 + a26.zt-3 + e2t
Figure 2.1: Bivariate VAR: Standard Form Equations

The bivariate third-order model is represented in its standard form in Figure 2.1. The
properties of the error (also known as innovations) terms (e1t and e2t) are crucial and
represent white-noise processes that are stationary (we will learn why this is important in the
next step) and correlated with one another. The sequences for the error terms are recreated in
excel using the formula “=NORMINV(RAND(),0,1)”. The NORMINV function returns the
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inverse of a probability corresponding to the normal cumulative distribution (i.e. RAND(),
which returns a random number > = 0 and less than 1) for the specified mean (0) and standard
deviation (1). If the VAR model isn’t specified in its standard form, I cannot apply ordinary
least squares (OLS) techniques to estimate the coefficients. The primitive form of the VAR
disallows using OLS because “yt has a contemporaneous effect on zt and zt has a
contemporaneous effect on yt” (Enders 2011, 285). To be precise, the yt sequence will
influence the zt sequence and vice-versa during the same time period that we try to estimate
their parameter values and hence runs into a multicollinearity problem with the regressors
and the errors terms ending up correlated. Now that I have specified the VAR model, let’s
move onto a few pertinent pre-estimation steps.
2. Pre-Estimation Steps
Stationarity tests and optimal lag length selection tests are the two key pre-estimation steps
that must be done before we can proceed onto estimating the VAR. Though I have already
specified that the third-order model was chosen, let’s take a look at the intricacies involved in
that lag length selection process. First, I tackle two important questions: “What does it mean
for a process to be stationary?” and “Why does it matter for our VAR model?”. There are
three necessary conditions for a timeseries to be considered stationary. Firstly, the
expectation of our process, let’s call it yt, needs to be equal to some constant, μ. Secondly, the
variance of yt needs to be equal to σ2, again a constant. Finally, the covariance for yt with yt+h
is some function of h (f[h]), and not a function of time. Essentially, the key thing to
remember here is that our process, yt, comes from some data generating process (DGP) that is
similar across all time periods. A process that satisfies these conditions is classified as
stationary and this basically assures that the yt process is not generated by different DGPs
from one period to the next and is consistent irrespective of time.
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To explain why stationarity matters for our VAR and understand how to run a
stationarity test on Stata and replicate it in excel, I reintroduce the bivariate model (see
Figure 2.1) discussed previously but only consider a first-order model (1 lag) to narrow our
focus. My steps can be followed along using the excel file “VAR Excelification (dead)”.
Figure 2.2 is a screenshot of the data table you will find in the “VAR_DFTest” sheet. There
are two main reasons for the stationarity conditions in the VAR model (and most timeseries
models). First, stationarity helps estimate any linear interdependencies between the included
variables for the given period. For instance, in Figure 2.2 if the CCSI or the unemployment
series were nonstationary, then I would struggle to accurately interpret the coefficient
estimates and describe the relationships shared by the two series across the target time period.
The second reason is a theoretical one and according to Lambert (2013), without stationary
timeseries we wouldn’t be able to leverage the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit
Theorem for inference purposes.
VAR- Stationarity Replica
Constants: a10:
Model: Unemployment Rate-> CCSI
a20:

0.303
3.247

Unemployment
Rate
Dates
CCSI
e1t
e2t
2000Q1
17.145
4.03
-0.991
2000Q2
17.145
3.93
-0.746
2000Q3
17.985
4.00
0.864
2000Q4
18.268
3.90
0.994
2001Q1
18.095
4.23
0.203
2001Q2
18.157
4.40
-1.776
2001Q3
21.808
4.83
0.729
2001Q4
23.044
5.50
-1.338
2002Q1
21.038
5.70
1.449
2002Q2
20.76
5.83
0.797
2002Q3
20.721
5.73
-1.445
2002Q4
20.735
5.87
0.672

yt
(unemployment) ▲yt
0
-0.443
0.700
1.966
2.416
0.846
1.798
0.682
2.370
3.413
2.180
3.066

0.959
-0.095
-1.335
-0.665
1.945
0.388
0.511
-0.461
-2.158
-0.219
-0.529
1.109

Parameters: a11:
a21:
zt
(CCSI)
0
-0.443
1.143
1.266
0.450
-1.570
0.952
-1.116
1.689
1.042
-1.233
0.886

0
3.152
2.508
3.886
7.907
7.911
6.798
6.242
3.499
5.946
7.191
8.231

0.989
0.3

a12:
a22:

▲zt

yt-1
0
3.152
-0.644
1.378
4.021
0.004
-1.113
-0.556
-2.743
2.447
1.245
1.039

-0.009
0.788
zt-1
0
0
-0.443
0.700
1.966
2.416
0.846
1.798
0.682
2.370
3.413
2.180

0
0
3.152
2.508
3.886
7.907
7.911
6.798
6.242
3.499
5.946
7.191

Figure 2.2: Screenshot of bivariate (first order) VAR used for Step 2

Running and Replicating Stationarity Tests: A common way econometricians test for nonstationary timeseries is by running a Dickey-Fuller test for the presence of a unit root process.
The mathematics behind the unit root process is beyond the scope of this thesis and the reader
can refer to the appendix for information and resources to understand the mechanics behind
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it. But, in short, the “unit root problem is concerned with the existence of characteristic roots
of a time series model on the unit circle” (Tsay 2008, 1). The existence of a unit root in the
VAR process is not a good sign as it indicates that the series may be nonstationary and carries
negative implications. The stationarity test begins with a null hypothesis that the chosen
timeseries variables, yt and zt, are nonstationary and the alternative hypothesis that they are
stationary. The Dickey-Fuller test is used in lieu of an ordinary t-test because under the null
hypothesis, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) fails, and I’m unable to use an ordinary tdistribution to test the t-statistic. To tackle this issue, I take the first differences of the
timeseries as it has a better chance of producing a stationary process. At the minimum, even
if the right-hand side processes are nonstationary, I am in a better position with the first
differenced series on the left. The delta-yt and delta-zt columns in the excel file show this
transformation and help us continue the stationarity test. The first-differencing improves our
situation but I still cannot use an ordinary t-test. I run into the same problem as before
because under the null hypothesis, yt-1 and zt-1 are still considered to be nonstationary and
thus the t-statistic is still not comparable to the t-distribution (CLT fails). This is where
Dickey and Fuller (1979) enter the scene and save us the hassle of tabulating the asymptotic
distribution of the least squares estimator for a11, a12, a21, and a22, the coefficients of yt-1 and
zt-1, under the null hypothesis that these processes are unit root. The final step for checking
whether the series are nonstationary is straightforward as I simply compare the t-statistic with
the Dickey-Fuller distribution. Figure 2.3 shows the results of the Dickey-Fuller test on Stata
and depicts our attempt at replicating the same test in the “VAR_DF Test” sheet of the “VAR
Excelification(dead)” excel file. If you hit F2 in the t-stats table in Excel, you can see how the
LINEST function is built using the first differences of yt and zt. The t-statistics found via
excel match the ones given by Stata and this confirms that the replication method is accurate.
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t-statistic for
DF Tests
-2.278

LINEST

-3.280

yt (unemployment
rate) equation
-0.15712 0.05408
0.06897 0.14056
0.0784 1.09784
5.18914
61
6.25418 73.5198
zt (CCSI) equation
-0.25646 1.39237
0.07818 0.43513
0.14995 1.44157
10.7608
61
22.3624 126.766

Figure 2.3: Excel Replication of Stata DF Test Results

The second pre-estimation step is the optimal lag length selection test. This step is a
crucial part of the identification process needed before I can reliably estimate the VAR. Let’s
revert back to the third order bivariate VAR shown in Figure 2.1 since I only used the single
order model to simplify the DF tests excel replication.
Optimal Lag Lengths: While it is technically possible to allow different variables in the VAR
to have varying lag lengths, it does not help use OLS estimation techniques since they require
identical regressors on the right-hand side for each equation. Selecting the lag length is also
important because it determines how many coefficients I’ll have to estimate from the model.
A model with p lag lengths and n equations will contain n*p coefficients plus the intercept
term. Enders (2011) captures the perils of not choosing the optimal lag length and states: “If p
is too small, the model is mis specified; if p is too large, degrees of freedom are wasted”
(Enders 2011, 303). As you may have guessed, I had run the optimal lag length test on Stata
using the “varsoc” command and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) picked 3 lags for
the model in Figure 2.1. Additional information on the AIC and other similar tests like it is
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provided in the Appendix. To maintain focus on the VAR steps that can explicitly be
replicated on Excel and to avoid resharing theoretical knowledge already stated by
academics, I push ahead to the next section. Now that the VAR model is specified and the
pre-estimation due diligence is completed, I’m ready to estimate the model specified in
Figure 2.1.
3. Estimation of the VAR
The standard form equations of the model are specified in Figure 2.1. An important thing to
note is that we always specify our VAR model in levels and not in differences. Specifying the
VAR in differences will result in mis-specification because the right-hand side variables will
vary across all equations in the model. Another key thing to remember is that the results from
the Dickey-Fuller test determine whether the VAR model can be constructed as specified.
This means that if the raw series is nonstationary, it must be stationary after first difference
(integrated of order 1, I(1)) or else it cannot be included in the model. Both the CCSI and
unemployment series are stationary. The estimation of the VAR model in Stata is done using
the command “var ytunemployment ztCCSI, lags(3)”. This command spits out the estimation
results as shown in Figure 2.4. Stata gives us 6 coefficients and one intercept term for each
equation (number of equations (n) * lags (p)) and the estimates table is divided into two mini
sections with the bolded variable representing the key endogenous variable for the respective
equation. The first coefficient, 1.561, adjacent to the “L1” row of the ytunemployment is
basically the a11 estimate depicted in the standard form equations in Figure 2.1. The second
coefficient, -0.371, corresponds to the a12 estimate and so on.
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Figure 2.4: Stata VAR Estimation Results

In terms of interpreting all these numbers, some researchers can intuitively jointly
interpret all the lagged values of the regressors. But the conventional way is to interpret them
in the same manner as an OLS regression. For instance, the a11 estimate can be interpreted as
the first lag of the unemployment rate (yt-1) having a positive impact of 1.56 percentage
points on average (at the 1% significance level) on the current level of unemployment (yt)
holding all its lagged values and those of other variables constant. While this type of
interpretation is valid and gives the researcher some insights, most econometricians prefer
running causality checks that help interpret the causal link of the combined lags of a variable
with other variables. Other use a visual tool to interpret these results and engage in
forecasting by seeing how the variables respond to different shocks in the model. This tool is
called an impulse response function and I exclude it from this thesis since the focus is less on
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forecasting and more so on finding the causal connections between CCSI and the key
explanatory variables. For an intuitive way to understand the effect of the coefficients, open
the “Stata VAR Excelification” excel file and scroll right in the “VAR_Replication” sheet to
column AI. Hit F9 and observe the graph to visually see how the underlying coefficients
impact the predicted ytunemployment in the graph. Estimating a VAR and being able to
interpret it on Stata is great, but it does not help us understand the underlying data generating
process of the model. To truly understand what is going on, I replicate this VAR estimation in
excel and run simulations to draw comparisons with the Stata output.
The excel replication discussion can be followed along by using the file “Stata VAR
Excelification.xls”. As seen in Figure 2.4, I begin with the known timeseries of the CCSI,
built using the Wcalc program, and the unemployment rate from Q1 2000 to Q4 2015 which
gives an n = 64. The errors terms ‘bounce’ as they are built using the same function as the
Dickey-Fuller tests to mimic white-noise processes. The bounce in the error terms comes
because the function pulls a random number, using the specified parameters, from a
probability distribution every time I run an operation in Excel. The data in columns F-M are
live primarily due to these errors. Hitting F9 on your computer allows you to observe this live
data and the effects of the sampling process. Next, to populate the F-M columns, which
contain the lagged values of yt and zt, I need to incorporate the standard form equations from
Figure 2.1. But the constraint to applying these equations is that I do not know the true
parameter values and don’t possess any valid estimates. Hence, I use the coefficient estimates
found through the Stata VAR estimation as starting values to build our excel replication. The
named range “Parameter_Table” spans Cells F1 thru U2 and includes the constants and
parameter estimates for the yt equation and the second row includes parameter estimates for zt
equation. The downside is that I’m making a big assumption that the Stata estimates are
reliable and unbiased. Let’s skip the first three cells of the yt column and assume zero values
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since I need three lagged values of each variable to include in the standard form equations
(yt-1, yt-2, yt-3, zt-1, zt-2, and zt-3). Thus, I begin with cell F7 and the formula inputted in
the cell can be viewed by hitting F2 in excel. Essentially, I transform the standard form
equations formula into excel here. The same step is repeated for zt and I enter its
corresponding values in the formula. After I have copied the formula for all the cells in yt and
zt, I can complete the remaining steps for the lagged values by either copying and pasting the
yt and zt values in the respective lagged value columns or referencing the appropriate cells
(hit F2 on the lagged value cells) for each lagged variable to their yt or zt equations.
Now that I have the full series of variables and their lagged values, I can use the builtin LINEST function in excel to estimate the model. Since LINEST can only estimate one
equation at a time we run it separately for yt and zt. To estimate the yt equation, I highlight
the 7 columns and 5 rows, [P4:V8] range (LINEST always includes 5 rows but the number of
columns depends on the coefficients being estimated) and input the formula (hitting F2
anywhere in the table displays the formula but remember to exit by hitting the ESC key). I
repeat the process in the [P10:V15] range for the zt equation. In the yt equation’s LINEST
table, cell U4 is the coefficient estimate of the a11 parameter and the estimates flow in a
reverse chronological order ending with P4 estimating the a16 parameter. Notice that the
estimates in the table continue to bounce since the data is still live. To verify our excel VAR
replication effort, I can run a simulation that repeats these OLS estimates multiple times and
plots the resulting sampling distribution. A 10,000 repetitions simulation of the U4 cell
returns an average (coefficient estimate) of 1.505 (see the “a11_sim” sheet) and an
approximate SE of 0.1332. At first glance it might seem tough to make a statement of
whether 1.505 is close enough (to the assumed a11 parameter of 1.56) but it becomes evident
that this estimate is biased when I look at the value in cell M7 (highlighted in yellow). I did a
simple calculation in cell M7 to test whether the approximate SE is large enough to allow for
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the error in the coefficient estimate to form an interval that included the a11 parameter value
of 1.56. Unfortunately, the resulting estimate is biased, and running similar simulations (see
sheets under “Simulations” tab) of other coefficients garners mixed results as some
simulations produce unbiased estimates (a13). Consistency of the estimator is another
important quality that one should care about, and Figure 2.5 illustrates that the excel VAR
model is consistent. I arrive at this conclusion because as n rises (from 32 to 64), the
estimates converge to the true mean.

Coefficient Estimate of
Coefficient Estimate of
a11 (cell U17) with n=32 a11 (cell U4) with n=64
Notes
Average
1.402 Average
1.505 n = 32 Vs n = 64
SD
0.2379 SD
0.1332 See Sheet: VAR_Replication
Max
2.263 Max
2.018
0.00133
Min
0.359 Min
0.947 Parameter value:
1.56

Histogram of $U$17 And
CCSI_VAR_Trial1!$U$4

$U$17
CCSI_VAR_Trial1!$U$4

0.35

0.85

1.35

1.85

Figure 2.5: Proof of the Estimator’s Consistency

Excel Replication with Dead Data: Replicating the Stata VAR model with live data on excel
gave us a lot of insights on the quality of the estimator and helped understand the black box
nature of the DGP. But it still leaves a gnawing doubt of whether my excel replication is
following the exact DGP and estimation technique of the Stata model. To clarify these
doubts, I run the VAR estimation again in Figure 2.6 but this time using deadened data
instead of live data. The VAR result shown in Figure 2.6 is available in the same file used to
run the DF tests, “VAR Excelification (dead)”. This is done by simply copying the error
series (e1t & e2t) and pasting them as values. The rest of the process remains the same on
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excel and the results of the LINEST function can be seen in Figure 2.6. A sure-fire way of
verifying the excel replication of VAR is by importing this deadened data seen in Figure 2.6
CCSI_VAR- Replica
Constants: a10:
0.09 Coefficients: a11:
1.56 a12:
-0.37 a13:
-0.26 a14:
Model: Unemployment Rate-> CCSI
a20:
3.05
a21:
0.63 a22:
0.43 a23:
-0.87 a24:
Unemployment
yt
zt
Excel
Rate
(unemployment) (CCSI)
yt-1
yt-2
yt-3
zt-1
zt-2
zt-3
Replica
Dates CCSI
e1t
e2t
2000Q1
17.145
4.03
-0.110
0.540
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 -0.0886
2000Q2
17.145
3.93
-0.907 -1.180
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.06734
2000Q3
17.985
4.00
-0.060 -0.788
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.97759
2000Q4
18.268
3.90
0.540
2.117
0.6305
5.1673
0
0
0
0
0
0 414.367
2001Q1
18.095
4.23
-1.132 -1.657
-0.0278
6.2854
0.630
0
0
5.167
0
0 1822.91
2001Q2
18.157
4.40
0.355
0.727
0.1024
8.4655 -0.028
0.630
0
6.285
5.167
0 LINEST
2001Q3
21.808
4.83
1.153 -0.037
1.3296
9.4004
0.102 -0.028
0.630
8.465
6.285
5.167 0.03749
2001Q4
23.044
5.50
-0.629 -0.075
1.5803
11.3092
1.330
0.102 -0.028
9.400
8.465
6.285 0.09373
2002Q1
21.038
5.70
-1.075 -0.105
1.0957
13.6518
1.580
1.330
0.102 11.309
9.400
8.465 0.98512
2002Q2
20.76
5.83
-1.520
0.085
-0.5133
14.3734
1.096
1.580
1.330 13.652 11.309
9.400 629.114
2002Q3
20.721
5.73
1.789
0.874
0.4143
14.1679 -0.513
1.096
1.580 14.373 13.652 11.309 5361.22

0.006 a15:
0.87 a25:

0.16186
0.11393
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Figure 2.6: Screenshot of deadened data and LINEST table

into Stata and running the VAR estimation command on it. After importing the data and
completing the necessary recoding I obtain the results shown in Figure 2.7 using Stata’s
VAR command. The estimated coefficients in the Stata VAR table precisely match the ones I
computed on the excel LINEST table! This is exciting since it clarifies any doubts over the
excel-VAR replication DGP matching Stata’s DGP.

Figure 7: Stata VAR Estimation of deadened data
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With the excel replication done, I have now covered the key focus areas by investigating the
three steps of specification, pre-estimation and, estimation of a simple VAR model. I will
very briefly touch upon the last two steps of the model to avoid digression and repeating what
others have explained better. Then I move onto the heart of my empirical analysis in the next
section by describing the data used in this paper and setting up the main hypotheses.
4. Post-estimation Steps
The two main post-estimation steps that need to be done are causality checks and diagnostic
tests. Equations in the VAR model can have high R-squared values without implying any
causal connections between the dependent variable and its regressors. When the VAR model
is applied to the CCSI in the next section and null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is
used to measure the significance of recessionary factors and political elite cues, the causality
checks will determine whether I have enough evidence to reject the null. Finally, the
diagnostic tests are done to ensure model integrity and gives us greater confidence and
additional reliability to justify the model’s results.
Causality Checks: There are three causality checks that can be used to determine a causal link
between the CCSI and its regressors. First, Stata’s VAR table provides “p-values” for every
coefficient estimated by the model. A low p-value is often interpreted as a statistically
significant result. For instance, a p-value < 0.05 corresponds to a statistically significant
result at the 95% significance level and a p-value < 0.01 corresponds to a statistically
significant result at the 99% significance level. The main question here is: “How do you
interpret a low p-value intuitively?” A low p-value tells us that there is enough evidence in
the sample to reject the null for the underlying population. Assuming a true null hypothesis, a
low p-value technically implies the probability of obtaining a resulting effect at least as
extreme as the one in the sample data.
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The p-values only provide the statistical significance of individual coefficients and
don’t provide an easy way to jointly measure the causality of all lags of a given regressor in
the equation. The Granger Causality test is one way to solve this issue. For simple OLS
regression models, I run F-tests that determine whether the increase in R-squared caused by
adding new independent variables was significant and a comparison of the whole-model to
the restricted model provided enough evidence to reject the null (of no significance). The
Granger Causality test acts in a similar manner and gives us a criterion to determine whether
the regressors and their lagged values “Granger cause” the key endogenous variable in the
equation (i.e. CCSI, in our main models).
Lastly, the third causality check is called a “linear test of parameter estimates” and is
usually known as the “Wald test”. The Wald test is another way to determine whether a
regressor or any of its lagged values are causally linked to the key endogenous variable. To
avoid delving into the complexities of the Wald test that have been better explained
elsewhere, I explain only a simple scenario. In a Wald test with a univariate variable, the
Wald test can be written as:

(𝜃− 𝛿0 )2
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜃)

, where “𝜃” is the maximum likelihood estimate and “𝛿”

is the parameter estimate and under the null hypothesis being true, this equation is chisquared distributed with 1 degree of freedom.
Diagnostic Tests: As stated previously, the diagnostic tests provide mathematical justification
to support the interpretation of the results from the VAR model. The three key areas that will
be targeted using the diagnostics are: autocorrelation, normality of innovations (error terms),
and stability. Firstly, the issue of autocorrelation (or serial correlation) of the errors terms can
be defined as a condition when the covariance of an error, e1t, and some other error, e2t, is not
equal to 0 and the two errors are not equal to each other. To keep things simple, when the
VAR equations have autocorrelated errors then OLS is no longer the best linear unbiased
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estimator (BLUE) since there are other estimators that perform better with this condition. The
first diagnostic check, to test for autocorrelation, is called the Lagrange Multiplier test and
can be run on STATA using the “varlmar, mlag(number of lags)” command. Running this
command results in a table like those seen in the Data Analysis where I can use the p-values
in the rightmost column to test the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the respective lag
order. A low p-value indicates that the model specification doesn’t provide enough evidence
to not reject the null of no autocorrelation.
The second diagnostic is done to check if the errors are normally distributed. There
are many reasons why normality is important but most prominently, a normally distributed
probability distribution makes the analysis easier and feasible. The true probability
distribution is almost impossible to ascertain for the dataset but testing for normality in the
errors helps capitalize on proven mathematical facts about the Central Limit theorem. The
Jarque-Bera normality test can be done on STATA using the command “varnorm, jbera”. The
output is a table that looks like the ones in the Data Analysis section and I can test the null
hypothesis of normality using the p-values in the rightmost column again. A low p-value in
this test indicates that there is evidence to reject the null of normally distributed errors in the
respective equation.
Lastly, the third diagnostic checks for stability of our VAR model. The details of
eigenvalue stability conditions are beyond the scope of this paper and will only be briefly
discussed. In the realm of differential equations, solutions can be represented as summations
of periodic contributions bounded by exponential functions. Eigenvalues represent the
powers of these exponential functions (Dawkins 2019). The stability test can be run on Stata
using the command “varstable” and the resulting table will clearly indicate whether all the
eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, an indication that the VAR satisfies the stability
condition.
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Applying the Model to CCSI
Previously, in the empirical strategy section, I provided a general overview of the main DGP
used to create the CCSI and using practical examples held a theoretical discussion of the
VAR. Before I proceed onto the data analysis using the VAR, I will describe all the other
endogenous variables that are theorized to influence climate skepticism and by extension, the
VAR model. Lastly, this section will include a few hypothesis tests that will come in handy
during the post-estimation phase of the analysis and help us in answering the key questions
posed in this paper.
Variables: The CCSI will be the key contemporaneously endogenous variable in every model
that is tested. This is obvious because we are trying to capture the effects and variations in
climate skepticism with correspondence to other endogenous variables. To recap, the CCSI is
a timeseries (spanning from 2000 to 2015), built using survey marginals of polling data to
estimate the aggregate-level of climate skepticism in the US. Based on inspiration from
Brulle et al. (2012), contemporary literature (see Literature Review) and other theorized
propositions, I have grouped my data into five categories: recessionary economic indicators,
political elite cues, scientific information, extreme weather, and media coverage and
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advocacy. Elite cues and structural economic variables will serve as my key explanatory
variables while the rest will act as controls.
1. Recessionary Economic Indicators: An economic recession is not consistently defined by
all economists and there is a debate on what factors should be considered as predictors and
indicators. Kenton (2019) and others often cite an approximate definition of recession as “two
consecutive quarters of negative economic growth as measured by the country’s gross
domestic product” (Kenton 2019). Moreover, economists often tout that weaknesses in

Figure 3.1: Summary Stats for Recessionary Economic Indicators

industrial production and employment are historical indicators of an economic recession.
Based on these observations, we’ve chosen five variables that can potentially capture the
recessionary attributes of the economy. These include Real GDP (% change from preceding
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quarter), unemployment rate, industrial production index, total nonfarm payrolls (%change
from preceding quarter), and a dummy variable for official recession dates (1 = quarter
officially recorded as a recessionary period). Figure 3.1 provides summary statistics on each
of these timeseries variables. As you can see, Figure 3.1 has a sixth variable, the price of oil.
The inclusion of this variable is partly inspired by Brulle et al. (2012), but also because it is
an important structural economic factor that has the potential of psychologically influencing a
population. The Appendix contains specific information on the sources and recoding efforts
of these variables.

Figure 3.2: Summary Stats
for Political Elite Cues

2. Political Elite Cues: Political elite cues are the second set of variables that will serve as key
explanatory models in my data analysis. While the choice of these variables was inspired by
Brulle et al. (2012) again, there is a strong rationale to include them based on contemporary
research and my hypotheses tests that will be discussed next. Amongst commonly referenced
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papers, McCright and Dunlap (2011) finds polarization along political lines and their
empirical analysis shows that Democrats hold consistent beliefs with the scientific consensus
while Republicans’ beliefs represent a mismatch. The six variables in this category that I
have chosen to test my hypothesis include: congressional hearing statements of Democrats
favoring climate change action, congressional hearing statements of Republicans opposing
climate change action, house hearings on climate change, senate hearing on climate change,
league of conservation voters (LCV) Democrats pro-environmental score, and LCV
Republicans anti-environmental score. Figure 3.2 provides summary statistics on these
timeseries variables. Again, more information including descriptions, sources and recoding
efforts of these variables are available in the Appendix.
Typically, in most regression analyses, the researcher includes a range of control
variables that help reduce the well-documented omitted variable bias in the model and
improve the accuracy of the estimator. The multiple categories of data included as controls
might tend to cause overparameterization of the model but there is sufficient research and
theory backing correlations between climate skepticism and these variables. Moreover, as
Enders (2011) states: “a VAR will be overparameterized in that many of these coefficients
will be insignificant. However, the goal is to find the important interrelationships among the
variables” (Enders 2011, 290). Thus, my approach is justified in continuing with these control
variables as the prospect of finding crucial relationships between these series is greater than
the risk of losing degrees of freedom and overparameterization. As I’ve already stated, please
refer to the Appendix for further documentation on these variables. The remaining three
categories of data are discussed below, and their summary statistics are available in the
Appendix. All the variables data can be explored first-hand since the Stata and excel files to
replicate the analysis are included in the paper.
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3) Scientific Information: This category is self-explanatory as it helps factor in the influence
of the scientific community’s contribution toward climate change in the model. I include two
variables here: popular scientific magazine articles on climate change and a dummy variable
noting periods which saw a release of major scientific reports on climate change (1 = quarters
when at least one such report was released).
4) Extreme Weather Conditions: Variables pertaining to extreme weather are one of the most
commonly appearing in empirical papers. Researchers differ in what metrics they choose to
use to capture the effects of this category but for my purposes I will stick with Brulle et al.
(2012) and include: overall climate extremes index, US percentage areas (very warm), US
percentage areas (very cold), and drought levels (using the Drought Severity Classification
Index).
5) Media Coverage and Advocacy: Finally, the media coverage and advocacy category is a
natural contender as a control variable due to its widespread influence on the public’s
perception of climate change. Since the nature and medium of media coverage has become so
widespread, it makes sense to compile these various sources into one proxy variable. This is
exactly what Brulle et al. (2012) does and I follow the same logic to build an additive index
by compiling data from major television networks and weekly news magazines. Media
advocacy is split into two segments to capture the “pro” and “anti” climate change sentiments
often espoused by the competing media factions. These two segments are environmental
magazines and conservative magazines on climate change.
❖ Hypothesis Tests
Given the vast dataset and a complex list of potential relationships between climate
skepticism and the discussed variables, I make purposeful decisions to rein in the empirical
strategy. Consequently, the Hypothesis tests are designed to narrow the focus on finding
interdependencies between climate skepticism and the key explanatory variables falling in
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either the recessionary economic indicators category or political elite cues. Before turning to
the analyses, I set up two hypothesis tests to represent and test my initial expectations based
on existing research and theory.
The Role of Recessionary Factors in Inducing Climate Skepticism
Imagining a causal link between economic recessions and climate skepticism might seem
arbitrary at first glance, but a deeper consideration of people’s priorities and their shortsightedness on such issues might unearth these complex relationships. Researchers and
scholars have provided reasonable evidence to believe that the Great Recession of 2008
negatively influenced public opinion on climate change (Scruggs & Benegal 2012). The
threat perception of climate change and the issue salience of the matter is particularly low and
public opinion surveys such as Gallup (2016) has stated that only about 1% polltakers name
any environmental issue when asked to identify the most important problem facing the
country. Thus, though my dataset includes only two major recessionary periods, I expect a
delayed influence on skepticism since the negative effects and magnitude of recessions vary
and take time to manifest in people’s lives.
Hypothesis 1: Economic indicators of recession (such as unemployment rate, declining GDP,
etc.) are more likely to heighten the aggregate-level climate skepticism in the US.
The Role of Partisanship and Political Elite Cues in Inducing Climate Skepticism
I’ve referenced multiple papers and sources that have researched and theorized the increased
polarization along the lines of partisanship and political ideology. The divide between
Democrats and Republicans on climate change existed back in the late 1980s but has grown
larger over time and records as one of the most polarizing issues since the Great Recession
(Egan & Mullin 2017, 218). Despite all the existing research, I hope to acquire a unique
perspective from my model and understand the influence of political elites on the public
mood regarding climate change. The interpretation of the results from this model will differ
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because I estimate trends between statements and voting patterns of Democrats and
Republicans in the Congress with climate skepticism. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I
split the political elite cues hypotheses into two parts to capture unilateral relationships
between these dichotomous variables and the CCSI.
Hypothesis 2(a): Pro-climate change statements and voting patterns of Democratic
Congresspersons are more likely to lower the aggregate-level climate skepticism in the US.
Hypothesis 2(b): Anti-climate change statements and voting patterns of Republican
Congresspersons are more likely to raise the aggregate-level climate skepticism in the US.
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Data Analysis
At the beginning of the Empirical Strategy section, I established a 5-step agenda to simplify
the complex DGP that the thesis has undertaken and extrapolate empirical findings to shed
light on the theoretical discussions and existing literature on climate skepticism. The DGP
overview and the Applying the Model to CCSI sections fulfilled the first couple of steps in the
agenda and this data analysis section will cover the rest. The methodology discussion of the
CCSI, replication attempts of the VAR, and definition of the hypothesis tests provide critical
information in understanding the data analysis and interpreting the results at the end. Given
the arsenal of timeseries data that I have to predict the CCSI at my disposal, the challenge
becomes how to avoid overparameterization of the model while extracting relevant
knowledge pertaining to the interrelationships among variables. I split the analysis into 2
comprehensive models, one specified to identify any potential causal connections between
recessionary economic indicators and climate skepticism. The second one serves a similar
function but focuses on likely relationships between partisan politics and skepticism. Given
that the VAR analysis has multiple pre and post-estimation steps attached to it, I will
walkthrough each model separately, make specific observations of Stata’s output for each
step, and interpret the estimation results from both models together at the end of the section.
The data analysis procedure for the VAR models can be summarized as follows:
1. Model Specification and Basic Setup
2. Pre-estimation steps:
a. Stationarity test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller)
b. Optimal lag length determination (AIC, etc.)
3. VAR model estimation
4. Post-estimation steps:
a. Diagnostic Tests (Autocorrelation, Normality, and Stability tests)
b. Causality Checks (Granger causality and Wald tests)
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❖ Model 1: Economic Recessions and CCSI
Step 1 - Model Specification: To follow along, open the Stata file “VAR_CCSI.dta” and the
do-file associated with Model 1, “Model1_Recession.ado”. The do-file has helpful comments
corresponding to each step but it’s particularly useful for those seeking to replicate and run
their own version of my VAR analyses. I discussed the challenges of imposing restrictions
and specifying the model to best estimate the VAR. I know that the chosen variables in the
reduced-form VAR need to pass stationarity tests before I can run the analysis. So, the
question that needs to be answered is: “How do we specify the VAR and impose restrictions
without knowing the stationarity conditions of the included timeseries variables?” This issue
wasn’t specifically addressed in the DGP: Vector Autoregression section because there are
several ways to tackle it and exploring it deeply would detract from the focus of my thesis. In
short, econometricians usually impose restrictions in two ways. The first one is a Choleski
decomposition and is sometimes criticized for its ad hoc nature and diminishing the role of
the economist to one that merely suggests appropriate variables to include in the VAR
(Enders 2011, 313). The second one is called a structural decomposition and imposes
restrictions by combining economic theory with vector analysis. For the purposes of this
paper, I use the first approach since I’m focused on uncovering the potential relationships
between recessionary indicators and skepticism. The standard forms of Model 1 are shown in
Figure 4.1 and the first four variables represent recessionary indicators while the next three
are controls for media coverage, scientific information, and extreme weather. The standard
practice is to order the key contemporaneously endogenous variable, i.e. the CCSI, last while
the least endogenous variable, Recession Dates dummy, is ordered first in our reduced-form
VAR. Stationarity tests and lag lengths of the model are discussed next.
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Model 1 VAR (4th Order Model):
y = CCSI, x = Recession Dates, z = Unemployment rate, r = Real GDP, i = IPI
y t (CCSI) = a 10 + a 11 .y t-1 + a 12 .y t-2 + a 13 .y t-3 + a 14 .y t-4 + a 15.x t-1 + a 16.x t-2 + a 17.x t-3 + a 18.x t-4 + a 19.z t-1 +
a 20.z t-2 + a 21.z t-3 + a 22.z t-4 + a 23.r t-1 + a 24.r t-2 + a 25 .r t-3 + a 26.r t-4 + a 27.i t-1 + a 28.i t-2 + a 29.i t-3 + a 30.i t-4 +
Lags(Co ntro ls: M edia Index) + Lags(Controls: S cientific Reports) + Lags(Controls: CE I) + e1t

Figure 4.1: Standard Form Equation for Model 1

Step 2(a) – Stationarity: The keen observer may have noticed that the Non-farm payrolls
variable was excluded from our VAR and this is simply because it is nonstationary and failed
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Stata commands for ADF tests are single-line
commands that specify the timeseries and the chosen number of lags. Complete results of my
ADF tests are shown in the data analysis section of the Appendix and I can move onto the
next step since all the included variables are integrated of order 1 (I[1]), that is they are
stationary after first difference. As a refresher to the DGP: Vector Autoregression section, the
ADF test can be interpreted by comparing the p-value against the Dickey-Fuller critical
values. Remember, I reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root if the p-value is
lower than the DF critical values (at least the 10% level). Since all the chosen variables pass
the stationarity tests, I can proceed with my analysis.
Step 2(b) – Optimal Lag Length: The optimal lag length was given away when I specified the
model using 4 lags. The results of Stata’s varsoc command to determine the optimal lag

Figure 4.2: varsoc command results in Stata
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length is shown in Figure 4.2 and I choose the AIC information criterion that specifies 4 lags.
In practice, I run the varsoc command first on the specified model to identify the ideal
number of lags and to include this number in my stationarity tests to run Augmented DF tests.
Step 3 - Model Estimation: When you run the “var” command as specified in the do-file,
Stata spits out a total of 32 coefficients for each equation in the VAR. This isn’t surprising
because I already know that each variable appears on the left-hand side once and has the
same set of regressors as the other timeseries variables. Table 1 hosts only the main VAR
estimation results (the equation with CCSI as the dependent variable) as I only care about the
relationships between the CCSI and its regressors and want to learn if recessionary economic
indicators are statistically significant and help predict the CCSI. The Stata table output is
slightly different from my table here which is formatted differently to highlight key
information. The Stata table provides coefficient estimates, standard errors, p-values, and
95% confidence intervals. A quick glance to check for p-values shows that only some of the
hypothesized recession variables are statistically significant. The null hypothesis significance
testing for this model and the partisan politics model are based on the hypothesis I set up in
the Applying the Model to CCSI section. I defer the hypothesis testing and interpretation of
these coefficients to the VAR Model Interpretation and Discussion section where I can
holistically discuss both models in tandem with each other.
Step 4 (a) – Diagnostic Tests: I briefly discussed the diagnostic tests and called them “a form
of post-mortem analysis of the VAR model.” Without these tests, the discussions of my
findings become baseless and will lack any conviction among econometricians. The three
diagnostics listed in my do-file are: the Lagrange-multiplier test for autocorrelation (Stata
command: varlmar), the Jarque Bera test for normality (Stata command: varnorm, jbera), and
a test for stability (Stata command: varstable). The Lagrange-multiplier test for our model is
shown in Figure 4.3 and I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at all lag
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orders since the chi-squared value is low and gives us a p-value that isn’t significant at the
5% level. Overall, I can comfortably state that the Lagrange multiplier test finds no evidence
of the existence of autocorrelation in Model 1. This result is a positive one because given the
complexity of predicting the CCSI, my VAR model does well to escape the perils of
autocorrelation. Potential reasons for the occurrence of autocorrelation and their drawbacks
are discussed in the DGP: Vector Autoregression and Appendix sections.
The second diagnostic test is the Jarque-Bera test for normality of the errors or
innovation terms in the VAR. Notice that in the do-file, I run the Stata commands for all the
diagnostic tests following the var command, so Stata knows which regression to use. Figure
4.4 displays the results of the test and observing the p-value column, I cannot reject the null
hypothesis of normally distributed errors for all variables except Recession Dates. The last
row of the table shows that the null cannot be rejected for all the error terms combined and
this makes my estimation process easier and gives confidence in the interpretations.

Figure 4.3: Lagrange-Multiplier Test Result

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol16/iss1/9

60

Sambatur: What Explains Climate Skepticism in the US?

Figure 4.4: Jarque-Bera Test Result

Finally, I test the stability condition of the model using the Eigenvalue stability
condition. Figure 4.5 lists all the eigenvalues and the modulus for the model and the most
important observation here is that the VAR model satisfies the stability condition. Please
refer to the DGP: Vector Autoregression and Appendix sections for more information on
what this entails. Let’s proceed onto the last step of running causality checks for the model.
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Figure 4.5: Eigenvalues – Stability Test Result

Step 4 (b) Causality Checks: The three basic ways to check for causal links between my key
explanatory variables and the CCSI were discussed earlier. I’ve already acquired the p-value
and the t-statistics of the included variables through the var estimation process and I can use
this to test individual coefficients for causality. Second, the Granger causality test is
particularly useful in jointly determining causality of all the variables in the equation. Figure
4.6 is a table of the Granger causality test for this model and I can reject the null hypothesis
of no Granger causality at the 5% significance level for all variables except unemployment
rate and release of scientific reports. Together, as seen on the last row of the table, it can be
stated that all the regressors Granger cause CCSI at the 1% significance level and any
inferential arguments of causality during the results discussion ought to be contemplated
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seriously. Another common way for researchers to assess causality is to use the direction and
classify it under a certain type of causality. The three common ones are unidirectional (x
Granger causes y but y doesn’t Granger cause x), bidirectional (if both x and y Granger cause
one another), and independent (when neither x or y Granger cause each other). The complete
excerpt of the Granger Causality Wald tests can be obtained by following the Do-file and
executing the “vargranger” command. Interestingly, of the four explanatory variables, three
possess unidirectional causality. So, I can conclude that at the 5% significance level and
lower, lagged values of Recession Dates, Real GDP, and the Industrial Production Index
Granger cause the CCSI.

Figure 4.6: Granger Causality Wald Test Result

Lastly, to strengthen my conviction and add greater value to the results discussion I run
the Wald tests on individual regressors, specifically the four recession indicators. Figure 4.7
is a collage of all these linear tests of the parameter estimates and I notice that only the
unemployment rate is not significant when tested individually but the rest of the variables are
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statistically significant and yield low p-values which reject the null hypothesis of no causality
and implies statistical significance at the 5% level.

Figure 7: Wald Test Results Collage

❖ Model 2: Partisan Political Influence and CCSI
Step 1 – Model Specification: The same Stata file (“VAR_CCSI.dta”) can be used to follow
along again and the do-file associated with Model 2 is: “Model2_PoliticsControls.ado”. The
standard form equations for Model 2 are listed in Figure 4.8. The chosen lag lengths (4)
corresponds with the optimal lag length tests which will be discussed in the next step.
Another noticeable aspect of this model specification are the omitted control variables that
were discussed in the Applying the Model to CCSI section. This is done purposefully as I ran
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multiple specifications to test for collinearity among the endogenous variables and
unfortunately none of the series in the Media advocacy and coverage category made the cut
as they failed the diagnostic tests. Since my focus is on the partisan influence of politics, I
proceed with this reduced form VAR and analyze how well my model can predict the
variance in the CCSI. The first 6 variables in the model represent my key explanatory
variables that will be used to draw inferences in the results section.
Model 2 VAR (4th Order Model):
y = CCSI, x = Dem. Statements, z = Repub. Statements, r = LCV Dems Score, i = LCV Repub. Score, k=
House Hearings, s = Senate Hearings
y t (CCSI) = a 10 + a 11 .y t-1 + a 12 .y t-2 + a 13 .y t-3 + a 14 .y t-4 + a 15.x t-1 + a 16.x t-2 + a 17.x t-3 + a 18.x t-4 + a 19.z t-1 +
a 20.z t-2 + a 21.z t-3 + a 22.z t-4 + a 23.r t-1 + a 24.r t-2 + a 25.r t-3 + a 26.r t-4 + a 27.i t-1 + a 28.i t-2 + a 29.i t-3 + a 30.i t-4 + a31.kt-1 +
a32.kt-2 + a33.kt-3 + a34.kt-4 + a35.st-1 + a36.st-2 + a37.st-3 + a38.st-4 + Lags(Co ntro ls: US% Warm Areas) + Lags(Controls:
Scientific Reports) + e2t

Figure 4.8: Standard Form Equation for Model 2

Step 2 (a) - Stationarity: The results of the ADF tests are shown in the Appendix and 7 of the
9 timeseries variables are stationary after first difference (i.e. Integrated of Order 1). This is
still acceptable because I care if the stationarity conditions are met by the included series and
the restrictions mandate that the VAR model is only constructed if this stationary condition is
satisfied to avoid spurious regressions. After running the Dickey-Fuller commands on Stata, I
can use the ADF results to test the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root. I reject the
null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for all 9 series since the respective p-values are
lower than the DF critical values.
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Step 2 (b) - Optimal Lag Length Selection: The varsoc command on Stata returns the table
output with the asterisks marking the chosen lag lengths under different information criterion.
Figure 4.9 displays these results and as I did with Model 1, I choose the AIC option of 4 lag
lengths. This marks the completion of the pre-estimation steps and we proceed with the

Figure 4.9: Optimal Lag Length Test Result

estimation and post-estimation steps to round up this walkthrough.
Step 3 – Model Estimation: Again, the main relevant regression results are displayed in Table
2. Running the var command on Stata spits out a ton of equations with symmetrical
regressors and coefficient estimates. Table 2 only focuses on the CCSI and a glance at the
table shows us that there are quite a few explanatory variables with statistically significant
coefficient estimates. As mentioned in the Model 1 walkthrough, I defer my analysis and
interpretation of the results to the VAR Model Results and Interpretation section.
Step 4 (a) – Diagnostic Tests: I run the same three diagnostic tests (Stata commands:
[varlmar], [varnorm, jbera], and [varstable] as I did for Model 1 and discuss their
implications here. First, the Lagrange-Multiplier test shown in Figure 4.10 is similar to the
one I conducted for Model 1. Again, this time around the p-values at all lag orders aren’t low
enough and I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation as a result. I can proceed
with this positive result that the sample of my model doesn’t show enough evidence to reject
the null of no autocorrelation at all lag orders.
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Figure 4.10: Lagrange-multiplier Result

Second, the output of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test for normality of errors or innovations
in the VAR model is available in Figure 4.11. The JB test results are not all positive and raise
a few red flags especially with the Republicans LCV score. This series has low p-values and
imply a rejection of the null hypothesis which assumes the presence of normally distributed
errors. There is a positive tone to our results as I cannot reject the null for the rest of my
variables, and I move on to the last diagnostic test with an awareness of the issues arising
from the series with non-normally distributed innovations in the model.

Figure 4.11: Jarque-Bera test Result

Lastly, Figure 4.12 lists the eigenvalues and the modulus for this model and once
again, Stata tells us that all the eigenvalues are inside the unit circle and the VAR model
satisfies the stability condition. This concludes the diagnostics for Model 2 and I move onto
the penultimate step leading up to the results interpretation and discussion section.
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Figure 4.12: Eigenvalues Stability
Result

Step 4 (b) – Causality Checks: The p-values and t-statistics of individual coefficients in my
model will be discussed in the next section. The Granger causality test is conducted in the
same way as Model 1 and the results are displayed in Figure 4.13. The data from the
causality test is promising as only one of the key explanatory variables (Senate Hearings) has
a high p-value and I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality. For the rest of
the included variables, the null hypothesis is rejected and referencing back to the DGP:
Vector Autoregression section, I know that Granger causality allows econometricians to
measure whether past values of a series help predict the current value of the key dependent
variable. For instance, in Figure 4.13 the variables measuring LCV score for Democrats and
Republicans are said to Granger cause CCSI as their past values help explain the current
level of the CCSI. As I did for Model 1, the Granger Causality Wald test table gives us
information to classify the nature of the causality shared between these variables. Table 3
provides a summary of the different types of causality shared between the 6 key explanatory
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variables and the CCSI in Model 2. The unidirectional classification for the Senate Hearings
variable might be confusing, but it’s essentially telling us that CCSI Granger causes Senate
Hearings. This is an intriguing finding that will be discussed more in the results section.
Democratic statements, Republican statements, LCV Republicans, and House hearings all
share a bi-directional causality with CCSI. This classification makes intuitive sense because
past values of CCSI potentially result in more statements by Democrats and Republicans for
or against climate change. Similarly, past values of CCSI seem to impact the voting patterns
of Republicans and the number of House hearings on climate change. Another surprising
result is the unidirectional causality of LCV Democrats (since CCSI doesn’t Granger cause
the LCV Democrats score). The optimist might claim this result suggests that the voting
patterns of Democrats stays consistent regardless of the past levels of climate skepticism in
the US. While this line of reasoning is fascinating, it is extremely hard to prove or verify
given the complexity of the model and prematurely stating it as fact might end up in
committing a type II error.

Figure 4.13: Granger Causality Wald Test Results
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Finally, I run the third causality check, a Wald test to perform linear hypothesis tests
of the parameters in the model. Figure 4.14 is a similar collage of all the Wald tests and I can
immediately notice that these are in sync with the Granger causality results unlike my Model
1 test results. The test results show that I can reject the null of no causality at a 5%
significance level for 5 of the 6 explanatory variables. The estimation results and any
relationships between the Senate hearings variable and the CCSI should be interpreted with
this awareness due to its unidirectional causality found through the Granger causality tests

Figure 4.14: Wald Linear Test Results Collage

and noncausality result from the Wald tests.
❖ VAR Model Results and Interpretation
Before I can begin interpreting the coefficients and drawing inferences from the VAR
models, I revisit my agenda for the empirical strategy section and contextualize the
discussions thus far. I broke this agenda down into five stages and have completed the first
three: building an aggregate-level measure of climate skepticism (CCSI), finding a way to
combine the CCSI with explanatory variables that represent our thesis (VAR), and assessing
the quality of these results from the VAR models (pre and post-estimation steps: stationarity,
autocorrelation, etc.). Technically, I began the fourth stage of interpreting the results when I
discussed causality in the VAR model walkthrough. Now, I can extract the estimation results
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from both models, interpret the results and critically examine them to answer the key
questions raised in the paper.
Recessionary Factors and Climate Skepticism in the US
In the build-up to the data analysis, I used existing literary findings and empirical research to
set up a null hypothesis that stated: “Economic indicators of recession (such as
unemployment rate, declining GDP, etc.) are more likely to heighten the aggregate-level
climate skepticism in the US”. The Model 1 specification included four variables to estimate
the influence of economic recessions on climate skepticism. Recession dates is my dummy
variable that represents quarters officially classified as recession periods between 2000 2015. The Lag 4 coefficient of Recession Dates says that on average, the CCSI is 1.42
percentage-points lower in the current quarter if the T-4 period (four quarters ago) was
undergoing a recession (versus a no-recession quarter) holding all other lagged values of
Recession Dates and lagged values of other included variables constant. The p-value is
significant at the 5% level so I can reject the null that this result was obtained by chance
alone. The estimated standard error is small at .007. None of the other lags of Recession
Dates is statistically significant. The Recession Dates dummy doesn’t provide much evidence
and I cannot definitively state that an economic recessionary period will predict a significant
shift in the CCSI. On the contrary, the Lag-4 coefficient suggests that in the aftermath of a
recessionary quarter, the CCSI is likely to fall by 1.42 percentage-points. This result fails to
reject the null hypothesis that recessionary economic factors do not heighten the CCSI.
Unemployment rate, Real GDP, and the Industrial Production Index have a combined
total of 3 (out of 12) coefficients that have a statistically significant result that are worth
considering; Lag 3 of Real GDP, Lag 3 and Lag 4 of IPI. Lag 3 of Real GDP has a coefficient
of 0.0000648 that is significant at the 5% level and suggests that on average, the CCSI goes
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up by 0.006 percentage points in the current quarter for a 1% increase in real DGP in the T-3
period, holding all other included variables and their lags constant. Again, this coefficient
doesn’t provide much evidence to support the claim that real GDP growth and CCSI might be
inversely related. The coefficient of Lag 3 of IPI says that on average, the CCSI falls by 1.2
percentage points in the current period when the IPI goes up by 1% in the T-3 period (or three
quarters ago) holding all other included variables and lagged values constant. While this
result may be interesting and suggests that IPI and CCSI are inversely related, my confidence
is shaky because the result is predicting an outcome based on an extended time period (3
quarters). But, the Lag-3 coefficient of the IPI does provide some evidence to suggest that I
can reject the null hypothesis. Moreover, as previously stated, the IPI has a narrower
definition conceptually when compared to the GDP. The Lag-4 coefficient of IPI is smaller in
magnitude relative to Lag-3 and the coefficient of 0.009 implies a positive impact on the
CCSI. Since both these coefficients are highly statistically significant, these results do carry
causal weight. But the extended timeline of the prediction coupled with inconsistent effects
across Lags 3 and 4 result in a cautionary approach while rejecting the null hypothesis.
Before I can comment on the causal links between economic recessionary variables and the
CCSI, I will refer to the two other causality checks performed in the previous section.
The Granger Causality tests and Wald tests provide intriguing results that might
contradict my interpretations of the OLS coefficients. The results of Model 1 might be a good
example for why experienced econometricians use multiple causality checks and tools to
determine causal links instead of relying solely on the VAR regression results. The results of
these supplementary tests suggest that all key explanatory variables, barring the
unemployment rate, are causally linked to the CCSI. Granted the Granger Causality only
provides evidence on the direction of causality and not magnitude, the more important
finding is that Recession Dates, Real GDP, and IPI all Granger cause CCSI. Both the

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol16/iss1/9

72

Sambatur: What Explains Climate Skepticism in the US?

Granger and Wald tests allow me to reject the null that economic recessionary indicators
aren’t causally linked to the CCSI. While the VAR regressions results were a mixed bag, the
Granger causality test and Wald test have given me a more definitive result. Rejecting the
null for both these tests means that the sample suggests there is enough evidence to reject the
null for the population. These results will be contextualized and given a definitive answer
with regards to the hypothesis alongside the Model 2 results in the Conclusion section.
Partisanship / Political Cues and Climate Skepticism
There is extensive literature specifically regarding the connections between political ideology
/ partisan values and climate skepticism. In the Applying the Model to CCSI section, I created
a two-part hypothesis to test claims like these: “opinion on global warming has become
increasingly polarized across partisan and ideological lines since the 1990s” (McCright &
Dunlap 2011, 178). The Model 2 specification and our data is capturing a slightly different
relationship than most papers. The statements made by Democrats and Republicans in
Congress and their voting patterns aren’t representative of direct opinions or expressions of
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Main VAR Regression Results:
VAR Results Table 1
Key Dependent VariableCCSI
Explanatory Variables
Recession Dates
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
Unemployment Rate
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
Real GDP
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
IPI
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
Controls
Media Index
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
Scientific Reports on CC
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
CEI
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
CCSI
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4

constant:
Sample Time:
Observations:
R2 :
Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Model 1

VAR Results Table 2

Key Dependent VariableCoefficients Standard Errors CCSI
Explanatory Variables
Dem. Statements Pro-CC
0.0133
(0.00737)
Lag-1
0.000663
(0.00826)
Lag-2
-0.00980
(0.00790)
Lag-3
-0.0142*
(0.00724)
Lag-4
Repub. Statements Anti-CC
-0.271
(0.583)
Lag-1
0.161
(0.491)
Lag-2
0.236
(0.409)
Lag-3
0.498
(0.465)
Lag-4
LCV Dems. CC Voting Score
0.00000533 (0.0000214)
Lag-1
-0.0000236 (0.0000264)
Lag-2
0.0000648* (0.0000256)
Lag-3
-0.0000351 (0.0000220)
Lag-4
LCV Repubs. CC Voting Score
-0.00131
(0.00267)
Lag-1
0.00255
(0.00389)
Lag-2
-0.0126**
(0.00437)
Lag-3
0.00979*** (0.00284)
Lag-4
House Hearings on CC
Lag-1
-0.0000752 (0.0000432)
Lag-2
-0.0000159 (0.0000525)
Lag-3
0.000102* (0.0000500)
Lag-4
0.0000811* (0.0000402)
Senate Hearings on CC
Lag-1
-0.000315 (0.00331)
Lag-2
-0.00426
(0.00355)
Lag-3
0.00174
(0.00349)
Lag-4
0.00383
(0.00364)
Controls
US (%) Very Warm Areas
-0.0346
(0.0198)
Lag-1
-0.0336
(0.0203)
Lag-2
-0.0389
(0.0214)
Lag-3
-0.0713**
(0.0230)
Lag-4
Scientific Reports on CC
0.472***
(0.119)
Lag-1
0.0130
(0.131)
Lag-2
-0.107
(0.158)
Lag-3
-0.0330
(0.132)
Lag-4
CCSI
Lag-1
Lag-2
Lag-3
Lag-4
0.129
(0.0994)
2001 Q1 - 2015 Q4
60
0.9522
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Model 2
Coefficients Standard Errors

-0.000356
-0.000445
0.000277
0.000420

(0.000241)
(0.000245)
(0.000246)
(0.000263)

0.000354
0.000122
0.00179***
-0.000749

(0.000517)
(0.000483)
(0.000462)
(0.000573)

0.0654
-0.268**
0.352**
-0.217*

(0.0712)
(0.0979)
(0.108)
(0.0994)

0.217
-0.658***
0.308
0.0485

(0.125)
(0.186)
(0.212)
(0.172)

0.00186***
0.000151
-0.0000847
0.0000640

(0.000488)
(0.000532)
(0.000470)
(0.000409)

-0.000575
-0.000765
-0.000872
0.000327

(0.000637)
(0.000709)
(0.000631)
(0.000590)

-0.00742
0.0387*
-0.00256
-0.000636

(0.0158)
(0.0152)
(0.0139)
(0.0133)

-0.00163
0.00154
0.00655*
-0.00386

(0.00326)
(0.00340)
(0.00309)
(0.00280)

1.169***
-0.567**
-0.0546
0.174

(0.144)
(0.203)
(0.183)
(0.103)

constant:
0.121
(0.0623)
Sample Time:
2001 Q1 - 2015 Q4
Observations:
60
R2 :
0.9439
Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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individuals with party affiliations. Since my CCSI is built using survey polls, it’s likely that
these individuals are the ones that hold these climate change beliefs which are classified as
skeptical. The VAR model is intended to capture how these political “elites” that represent
common interests in Congress can potentially predict the level of the CCSI at a given time.
The two-part hypothesis suggested that: “Pro-climate change statements and voting patterns
of Democratic Congresspersons are more likely to lower the aggregate-level climate
skepticism in the US” and “Anti-climate change statements and voting patterns of Republican
Congresspersons are more likely to raise the aggregate-level climate skepticism in the US”.
The first of my six explanatory variables in Table 2 is the pro-climate change
statements made by Democrats (Stata label: DemsStatmnts) in Congress. None of the Lags of
DemsStatmnts are statistically significant and thus these results don’t provide much evidence
in support of my hypothesis. The second variable is the anti-climate change statements made
by Republicans in Congress (Stata label: RepubStatmnts). The only lagged value that is
statistically significant here is Lag 3. The 0.0017 coefficient might appear to be relatively low
magnitude but it suggests that on average, the CCSI goes up by .17 percentage points in the
current quarter if the anti-climate change statement made by a Republican Congressperson
increased by 1 in the T-3 period (3 quarters ago) holding all other variables and their lagged
values constant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis and since it is statistically
significant at the 1% level, I can reject the null hypothesis that Republican anti-climate
change statements do not impact the CCSI. Thus, I can state that while pro-climate change
statements made by Democrats aren’t statistically significant, anti-climate change statements
made by Republicans in Congress are effective and causally linked to the CCSI.
Before skipping to the LCV scores, I take a quick look at the House and Senate
hearings. The House and Senate hearings were included to test the “political cues” aspect of
the hypothesis and a quick glance at the respective coefficients shows that only Lag 1 of the
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House hearings on climate change had a statistically significant result. This coefficient
suggests that House hearings and CCSI are positively related and I can reject the null of no
relationship between House hearings and CCSI for Lag-1. Finally, the last couple of
explanatory variables are the LCV scores of Democrats and Republicans. To reiterate, the
LCV scores are an aggregated average of individual Democrats (or Republicans) scores based
on their votes for or against specific climate change related legislations in the House and
Senate. A higher score indicates a voting pattern that is supportive of climate change action.
For the LCV score of Democrats (Stata label: LCVDems), Lags 2 and 3 are highly
statistically significant (at the 1% level) results. The Lag 2 coefficient of LCVDems tells us
that on average, the CCSI falls by approximately 26 percentage points in the current period
for a 1 percentage point increase in the LCV score in the T-2 period (2 quarters ago) holding
all lagged values of LCVDems and other included variables constant. This is an intriguing
finding and instantly demands further exploration. The estimated standard error is large and
suggests that there is a high margin of error for this estimate. Barring the high estimated SE,
my confidence in this result grows due to the postestimation causality checks mentioned
previously. The Granger causality tests discussed in the previous section indicate that
LCVDems Granger causes the CCSI. The Wald tests provided a similar result as the low pvalue implies that I can confidently reject the null of no causality for LCVDems.
Lags 3 and 4 for LCVDems both produce significant results but the positive effect in
Lag 3 raises a concern. Does the sign change imply a reverse effect compared to the other
two lags? Without any further information or specialized knowledge about the complications
of sign switching, I am forced to interpret it as a reactionary contradicting effect due to
factors that isn’t completely knowable over the T-3 extended timeline. Again, this goes
beyond the scope of the thesis and is nothing beyond an educated guess. The Lag 3
coefficient implies an average positive effect of 35 percentage-points on the CCSI in the
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current quarter for a 1% increase in LCVDems in the T-2 period, holding all other variables
constant. The Lag 4 coefficient implies the same negative effect as Lag 2, but slightly lower
at 21 percentage-points, for the T-4 period.
The last explanatory variable for Model 2 is the LCV score of Republicans
(LCVRepubs) and only both Lag-2 produces statistically significant results. The coefficient
of Lag 2 is perhaps the most fascinating result of the model as it implies that on average the
CCSI falls by 65 percentage-points in the current quarter for a 1%-point increase in
LCVRepubs in the T-2 period, holding all other variables and their lags constant. While this
result is significant at the 0.001 level, implying a one in a thousand chance of being wrong,
the high estimated SE and the non-normally distributed errors (see JB test result) induce some
caution about the magnitude of the effect. Regardless, the Lag-2 coefficient suggests a strong
causal link between voting patterns of Republican Congresspersons and the CCSI. The
Granger Causality and Wald tests produce consistent findings and further my conviction
about a causal link between the Republican LCV scores and CCSI.
The VAR Model Results and Interpretation section broadly discussed the magnitude
and causality of all my explanatory variables but didn’t tie these results back to the initial
hypotheses. Table 3 is an attempt to consolidate the results of the three causality checks
across both models for the key explanatory variables. In the next section, I will attempt to
contextualize the vast information available in the two models, explain the results in tandem
to the hypothesis tests, and provide a final answer to the main research question.
Despite multiple theoretical predictions and discussions of causal connections
between economic recessions and CCSI, I only found a few meaningful connections in the
model. A few important things to note are that the sample size for Model 1 only possesses
two periods of extended recessionary effects. This might have lowered the probability of
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sniffing out any trends and patterns in the CCSI using a model specified with recessionary
indicators. Furthermore, both models didn’t include all the control series available in the
dataset since the resulting VAR model failed diagnostic tests and rendered unreliable
estimates. In the final few sections, I briefly discuss the economic and political significance
of my findings and suggest a few avenues for further research on this fascinating topic.
Table 3: Overview of Causality Test Results
Causality Check Summary
Explanatory Variables
Recession Dates

Causality Check Summary

Model 1
Test #1: OLS
P-Values

Test #2: Granger
Causality

Test #3: Wald

✓

✓

✓

Lag 4 (P < 0.05)

(Unidirectional)

(P < 0.05)

Unemployment Rate

X

X

Explanatory Variables

Model 2
Test #1: OLS
P-Values

Republican Statements

Test #3: Wald

✓

✓

(bidirectional)

(P < 0.05)

✓

✓

✓

(P < 0.001)

(bidirectional)

(P < 0.001)

Lag 2 (P < 0.01)
Lag 3 (P < 0.01)
Lag 4 (P < 0.05)

✓

✓

(unidirectional)

(P < 0.01)

✓

✓

✓

Lag 2 (P < 0.001)

(bidirectional)

(P < 0.01)

✓

✓

✓

(P < 0.001)

(bidirectional)

(P < 0.01)

Democrats Statements

X

Test #2: Granger
Causality

X

✓
Real GDP

IPI

✓

✓

✓

Lag 3 (P < 0.05)

(Unidirectional)

(P < 0.05)

✓

✓

✓

Lag 3 (P < 0.01)
Lag 4 (P < 0.001 (Unidirectional)

LCV Dems Score

LCV Repubs. Score

(P < 0.001)
House Hearings

Senate Hearings

X

X

X

Note: All Causality Tests Results summarized from Granger Causality Tests

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol16/iss1/9

78

Sambatur: What Explains Climate Skepticism in the US?
Back to Contents

Conclusion
The famed theoretical physicist, Albert Einstein once said: “The grand aim of all science is to
cover the greatest number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible
number of hypotheses or axioms” (“Albert Einstein”, 2016). Obviously, I’m not a scientist
and this paper doesn’t talk about the theory of relativity. But my empirical strategy renders
countless small and large-scale findings while attempting to answer a question based on two
broad hypotheses. I’ll aim for a conclusion that is succinct and gathers the key findings from
the Empirical Strategy section, that is nothing short of an abyss filled with information.
First, I’ll consider the VAR regression results from Table 1 of the Main VAR
Regression Results and the summary of the causality checks for Model 1 in Table 3 to prove
or disprove Hypothesis 1. The three causality checks for the four chosen explanatory
variables, clearly indicates a trend and a potential relationship between recessionary factors
and CCSI. The only variable that fails to show any significant result whatsoever is
unemployment rate. Results from IPI provide the best claim to establish a causal link with the
CCSI. The IPI variables has multiple lags (3 and 4) with highly statistically significant results
across the three causality checks that give me enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of
no causality. The low p-values suggests the likelihood of my dataset given a true null
hypothesis; i.e. economic recessionary factors do not explain an increase in the CCSI.
Referring to Table 3 again, I can reject this null for both the Recession Dates and the Real
GDP as well since these variables produce consistent results across the three causality checks
but at a lower level of significance compared to the IPI. For Hypothesis 1, I find a positive
result with some mixed information but find evidence to reject the null that economic
recessions don’t explain an upward trend in CCSI.
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Next, let’s turn to the VAR regression results for Model 2 in Table 2 of the Main VAR
Regression Results and the summary of the causality checks in Table 3 in order to prove or
disprove the Hypothesis 2 (a & b). The null hypothesis for 2 (a) states that pro-climate
change statements and voting patterns of Democratic Congresspersons has no impact on
lowering the CCSI. The Democratic statements variable produces mixed results since the
regression doesn’t provide any lags with significant results and the p-values for Granger
Causality and Wald tests are significant at the 5% level. Based on this mixed result, I don’t
find enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Next, the LCV Dems variable,
representing Democrats’ voting patterns, has three coefficients at lags 1, 2, and 3 that are
statistically significant, and their magnitude indicates a strong negative relation with the
CCSI. Since, the other two causality checks give consistent statistically significant results,
there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Again, the low p-values for LCV Dems
across all causality checks suggest my sample provides enough evidence to reject the null for
the target population (U.S. public). For Hypothesis 2 (a), I find a mixed result where I have
little confidence to reject the null that pro-climate change statements made by Democrats
don’t explain a negative trend in CCSI, but find enough evidence to reject the null that proclimate change voting patterns of Democrats don’t explain a fall in the CCSI.
Finally, I can use the same results from Model 2 to test the null hypothesis of 2 (b)
which states that anti-climate change statements have no impact on raising the CCSI and proclimate change voting patterns of Republican Congresspersons has no impact on lowering the
CCSI. The Lag 3 coefficient of Republican statement is highly statistically significant (p<
0.001) and positively affects the CCSI. Moreover, the causality checks indicate consistent
results across all tests, and this is sufficient evidence to reject the null. Lastly, the LCV
Republicans score will help understand the existence of any causal effects between voting
patterns of Republican Congresspersons and the CCSI. Table 3 clearly indicates that all three
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causality checks produce statistically significant results, and this is enough evidence to reject
the null hypothesis. A key observation from the Model Results and Interpretation pertained to
the magnitude and direction of causality for the Lag-2 coefficient of LCV Republicans. The
negative effect might seem confusing, but it makes sense since the LCV score allots higher
scores for pro-climate change voting patterns. One interpretation is that a higher LCV score
for Republicans is more effective in lowering the CCSI than a higher LCV score for
Democrats. For Hypothesis 2 (b), I find a consistent result where I can reject the null that
anti-climate change statements made by Republican elites don’t explain a positive trend in
CCSI, and also find enough evidence to reject the null that pro-climate change voting
patterns of Republicans don’t explain a fall in the CCSI.
Main Takeaways: Before I answer the main research question, here is a shortlist of insights
and empirical results that I find the most intriguing:
1. I initially expected more evidence from the Recession Dates and Unemployment Rate
variables. But it was IPI, with relevant coefficients, that helps explain the variance of the
CCSI and bolster the case for a causal link between economic recessions and climate
skepticism.
2. House hearings share a causal link with the CCSI and are more relevant in explaining the
variance in the CCSI than Senate hearings. The bidirectional causality for House
Hearings and CCSI (Table 3) implies that there is evidence to suggest that higher levels
of CCSI has a causal impact on the number of house hearings too.
3. Republican anti-climate change statements share a more consistent causal link with the
CCSI than Democratic pro-climate change statements (Table 3). One potential theory
why this might be the case is because the data used to construct the CCSI comprises of
skeptical public responses belonging to people from conservative backgrounds or identify
as Republican.
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4. The unidirectional causality of LCV Democrats suggests that changes in CCSI do not
influence the voting patterns of Democrats. Contrary to political statements, voting
patterns of Democrats and Republicans are equally influential in explaining the CCSI.
The higher magnitude impact in mean changes of the CCSI with respect to LCV
Republicans suggests that pro-climate change voting from Republicans is more effective,
since it might elicit a stronger decline in CCSI compared to Democrats’ voting patterns.
Final Answer to Research Question
Given the target time period of Q1 2000 to Q4 2015, the key decisions made to compute the
CCSI, and including/excluding variables to represent recessions and partisanship, there is
some evidence to back the claim that economic recessions explain climate skepticism. But,
the VAR results for Model 1 do not show consistent patterns and strong effects across all
recession variables. The VAR results from Model 2 identify a more systematic pattern with a
larger magnitude impact on the CCSI. Thus partisanship, represented through the lens of
political elite cues, emerges as a clear winner in explaining the variance and movement in
aggregate-level climate skepticism in the U.S.
Avenues for further research
While there are many creative ways one could extend this thesis or reframe the research
question, two potential areas that could be interesting for further research are:
1. Studying interaction effects and analyzing the CCSI with greater context on the
demographics of the underlying population. One way to do this might be to build
state-wise CCSI based on local and state survey questions and running data analysis
on these aggregates, but more focused measures of climate skepticism.
2. Introducing an element of forecasting which uses the VAR regression results to make
predictions of possible influencers of climate skepticism. This could help with public
policy recommendation and can refocus the problem of climate skepticism from an
“agnotology” perspective.
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Appendix
4. Empirical Strategy - DGP: Climate Change Skeptic Index
Table S1: Climate Change Skeptic Index Input Data (2000 – 2015)
Summary Score
(% Sceptic)
Sample Size

S.No

Variable Name

1

GallupClimateWorry

4/9/2000

12

72000

2

GallupSeriousness

12/31/2000

30

72000

3

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2001

5

4

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2001

5

GallupGWEffects

6
7
8
9
10

S.No

Summary Score Sample
(% Sceptic)
Size

Variable Name

Date

51

USPSR

2/28/2006

6

2000

52

USPSRAAAAA

2/28/2006

24

2000

72000

53

USPSRA7

2/28/2006

18

2000

13

72000

54

USPSRA8

2/28/2006

26

2000

3/5/2001

7

72000

55

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2006

5

72000

GallupGWNews

3/5/2001

30

72000

56

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2006

15

72000

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2001

4

72000

57

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2006

8

72000

USPSRA

4/26/2001

14

1202

58

GallupGWNews

3/5/2006

30

72000

USPS

4/26/2001

25

1202

59

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2006

36

72000

USGALLU

6/1/2001

40

1011

60

GallupGWScientists

3/15/2006

3

72000

Date

11

USCBSNYT

6/20/2001

17

1050

61

USCBSNYT

5/9/2006

30

1241

12

USCBSNYTT

6/20/2001

22

1050

62

USCBSNYTTT

5/9/2006

6

1241

13

USCBSNT

6/20/2001

32

1050

63

USIPSOSRR

12/22/2006

9

1000

14

USPSRAA

10/24/2001

13

1281

64

USNBCWSJ

1/29/2007

33

1007

15

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2002

6

72000

65

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2007

6

72000

16

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2002

17

72000

66

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2007

16

72000

17

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2002

9

72000

67

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2007

8

72000

18

GallupGWNews

3/5/2002

31

72000

68

GallupGWNews

3/5/2007

33

72000

19

USWASHP

7/8/2002

19

1402

69

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2007

35

72000

20

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2003

10

72000

70

USGALLUP

4/19/2007

26

1007

21

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2003

17

72000

71

USGALLUPP

4/19/2007

30

1007

22

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2003

10

72000

72

USCBSNYT

4/26/2007

12

1052

23

GallupGWNews

3/5/2003

33

72000

73

USCBSNYTT

4/26/2007

20

1052

24

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2003

33

72000

74

USCBSNYTTT

4/26/2007

3

1052

25

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2004

7

72000

75

USCBSNY

4/26/2007

9

1052

26

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2004

19

72000

76

USCBSNYTTTT

4/26/2007

9

1052

27

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2004

11

72000

77

USORCCC

5/9/2007

19

1028

28

GallupGWNews

3/5/2004

38

72000

78

USORC

5/31/2007

42

1028

29

USGREEN

4/13/2004

10

1610

79

USIPSOSR

6/30/2007

7

1001

30

USUMARY

6/25/2004

23

753

80

USICR

7/1/2007

20

2140

31

USUMARY1

6/25/2004

54

753

81

USPSRNEW

8/31/2007

39

1002

32

USUMARY2

6/25/2004

19

753

82

USPSRNEW1

8/31/2007

42

1002

33

USUMARY3

6/25/2004

29

753

83

USPSRNEW2

8/31/2007

10

1002

34

USUMARY4

6/25/2004

30

753

84

USPSRNEW3

8/31/2007

42

1002
1002

35

USPSRAA

8/18/2004

12

2009

85

USPSRNEW4

8/31/2007

13

36

GallupSeriousness

12/31/2004

38

72000

86

USPSRNEW5

8/31/2007

17

1002

37

USUMARY5

1/18/2005

29

801

87

USPSRNEW6

8/31/2007

18

1002

38

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2005

6

72000

88

USPSRNEW7

8/31/2007

17

1002

39

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2005

9

72000

89

USIPSOSR

9/26/2007

20

1001

40

GallupGWNews

3/5/2005

31

72000

90

USCBS

10/18/2007

15

1282

41

USUMARY

7/5/2005

21

812

91

USCBSNYT

12/31/2007

15

1133

42

USUMARY1

7/5/2005

44

812

92

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2008

7

72000

43

USUMARY6

7/5/2005

28

812

93

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2008

17

72000

44

USUMARY7

7/5/2005

6

812

94

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2008

11

72000

45

USUMARY8

7/5/2005

13

812

95

GallupGWNews

3/5/2008

35

72000

46

USUMARY9

7/5/2005

28

812

96

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2008

7

72000

47

USPSRAA

11/17/2005

10

2006

97

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2008

38

72000

48

USABCWPPP

1/29/2006

35

1002

98

USSRBI

5/8/2008

24

1502

49

USPSRAAA

2/28/2006

8

2000

99

USORC

6/6/2008

45

1035

50

USPSRAAAA

2/28/2006

14

2000

100

USPSRNEW8

6/20/2008

19

1010
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S.No

Variable Name

Date

101

USSRBI3

8/5/2008

102

USABCWPPPP

12/20/2008

Summary Score Sample
(% Sceptic)
Size
18
20

Variable Name

1502

141

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2011

18

1003

142

GallupGWNews

3/5/2011

43

72000

143

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2011

8

72000

144

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2011

43

72000

145

USCBS

4/30/2011

21

1021

146

USORC

9/15/2011

51

1038

147

USCBSNY

9/16/2011

12

1566

148

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2012

7

72000

149

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2012

23

72000

150

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2012

15

72000

103

USCBS

2/28/2009

22

864

104

USCBSSS

2/28/2009

32

864

105

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2009

7

72000

Date

Summary Score Sample
(% Sceptic)
Size

S.No

72000

106

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2009

20

72000

107

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2009

16

72000

108

GallupGWNews

3/5/2009

41

72000

109

USPAF

4/3/2009

27

1001

110

USPAFF

4/3/2009

37

1001

151

GallupGWNews

3/5/2012

42

72000

111

USPAFFF

4/3/2009

9

1001

152

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2012

7

72000

112

USPAFFFF

4/3/2009

12

1001

153

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2012

41

72000

113

USORCC

5/5/2009

17

2019

154

USCBSNYT

6/30/2012

27

990

114

USPSRA6

7/9/2009

13

2001

155

USCBSNYT

6/30/2012

25

990

115

USSRBI

10/22/2009

32

1500

156

USCBSS

10/31/2012

9

1132

116

USSRBI1

10/22/2009

5

1500

157

USPRRI

12/13/2012

34

1018

1500

158

USORC

1/31/2013

47

814

159

USCBSS

1/31/2013

10

1052

160

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2013

8

72000

161

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2013

23

72000

162

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2013

15

72000

163

GallupGWNews

3/5/2013

41

72000

164

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2013

6

72000

165

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2013

39

72000

166

GallupGWNatural

3/10/2013

40

72000

117

USSRBI

10/31/2009

32

118

USABCWP

11/24/2009

17

1001

119

USSRBI2

12/3/2009

51

2000

120
121

USORC
USORCCCC

12/7/2009
12/7/2009

54

1041

24

1041

122

USCBSNY

12/14/2009

27

1031

123

USABCWPP

12/18/2009

62

1003

124

USABCWPPPPP

12/18/2009

29

1003

125

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2010

7

72000

167

USCBS

4/30/2013

21

977

126

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2010

29

72000

168

USCBS

4/30/2013

15

977

127

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2010

19

72000

169

USCBSS

4/30/2013

10

977

128

GallupGWNews

3/5/2010

48

72000

170

USCBSS

4/30/2013

8

977

129

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2010

10

72000

171

GallupSeriousness

12/31/2013

41

72000

YPCCCtaxdividendOppose 2/15/2014

130

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2010

46

72000

172

24

13000

131

USCBSNYT

4/14/2010

29

1580

173

YPCCCCO2limitsOppose

2/15/2014

34

13000

132

USVIRGCU

5/27/2010

42

1001

174

YPCCCregulateOppose

2/15/2014

23

13000

1001

175

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2014

10

72000

176

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2014

24

72000

177

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2014

18

72000

178

GallupGWNews

3/5/2014

42

72000

179

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2014

8

72000

180

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2014

40

72000

181

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2015

10

72000

182

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2015

24

72000

183

GallupGWEffects

3/5/2015

16

72000

184

GallupGWNews

3/5/2015

42

72000

185

GallupGWScientists

3/5/2015

8

72000

186

GallupGWHumanActs

3/5/2015

41

72000

187

GallupSeriousness

12/31/2015

42

72000

133
134
135
136

USVIRGCU1
USVIRGCU2
USGALLUPPP
USCBS

5/27/2010
5/27/2010
6/30/2010
8/31/2010

45
49

1001

20

1014

26

847

137

USCBS

10/31/2010

25

1253

138

GallupSeriousness

12/31/2010

48

72000

139

GallupPersonalWorry

3/5/2011

7

72000

140

GallupClimateWorry

3/5/2011

28

72000
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Table S2: CCSI Iteration History (Provided by WCALC)
Iteration
1
2
3
4

Convergence
0.2296
0.021
0.0037
0.0005

Criterion
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

Items
19
19
19
19

Reliability
0.616
0.715
0.72
0.721

AlphaA
0.568
0.501
0.501
0.5

AlphaB
0.656
0.659
0.663
0.664

Table S3: Threat Index Loadings and Descriptive Variable Information
Variable
Loading
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Variable
Name
GallupClimateWorry
GallupSeriousness
GallupPersonalWorry
GallupGWEffects
GallupGWNews
GallupGWScientists
USCBSNYT
USCBSNYTT
USPSRAA
GallupGWHumanActs
USUMARY
USUMARY1
USCBSNYTTT
USCBSNY
USORC
USIPSOSR
USCBS
USSRBI
USCBSS

Cases
15
4
15
15
15
9
6
2
3
10
2
2
2
3
5
2
6
2
3

Dimension 1
Loading
0.98
0.99
0.435
0.952
0.967
0.911
0.774
-1
0.967
0.915
1
1
1
0.809
0.999
1
0.948
1
0.88

Mean
19.8
39.25
7.2
12.667
37.333
6.778
21.5
21
11.667
39.2
22
49
4.5
16
47.8
13.5
21.167
28
9.333

Standard
Deviation
5.009
6.457
1.6
4.044
5.594
2.043
7.089
1
1.247
3.682
1
5
1.5
7.874
4.261
6.5
3.804
4
0.471

Dimension 1 Information:
Eigen Estimate: 1.53 of possible 1.89
Percentage Variance Explained: 80.73
Weighted Average Metric: Mean - 23.63, Std. Dev - 3.80
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Table S4: Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Analysis
Variables

Measures
CCSI
Recession Dates

Mean
Standard Deviation
23.62745
3.83207
0.15625

Minimum
16.669

Maximum
32.154

0.3659625

0

1

1.80271

4

10

1257.655

12924.18

17456.22

4.911275

87.5984

106.3359

Unemployment Rate
6.35938
Economic
Real GDP (constant 2012) 15205.02
Recessionary
Industrial Production Index 98.04934
Data

Partisanship /
Political Elite
Cues

Controls:
Extreme
Weather

Controls:
Media
Controls:
Scientific
Information

Total Nonfarm Payrolls

134279.6

3550.869

129804

143125

Price of Oil

2.5604

0.82998

1.1973

3.901

10.4375

11.3667

0

43

3.6875

7.285286

0

35

LCV Democrats Score

84.60453

4.75323

75.14231

93.24028

LCV Republicans Score

12.55761

4.34647

3.80359

18.02133

House Hearings on CC

6.265625

6.69338

0

32

Senate Hearings on CC

4.78125

4.968053

0

22

US % Warm Areas

19.47042

11.80179

1.14

46.56

US % Cold Areas

4.1663

6.41102

0

35.13667

Climate Extremes Index

21.33281

7.67746

8.58

45.26

Drought Levels

109.9875

37.20504

39.76923

207.3077

Media Coverage Index

115.3125

54.84549

31

314

Environmental Magazines 11.46875

5.887756

2

27

Conservative Magazines

4.40625

3.910583

0

20

Science Magazines
78.45313
Release of Major Scientific
Report
0.546875

37.19273

23

163

0.5017331

0

1

Democrat Pro-CC
Statements
Republican Anti-CC
Statements

Table S5: Survey Questions Used in Construction of CCSI (by WCALC)
Full Question Text

Variable Name

Dates Administered

Source

I'm going to read you a list of environmental problems.
As I read each one, please tell me if you personally
worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount,
only a little or not at all. First, how much do you
personally worry about: Global Warming & Climate
Change
Is the seriousness of global warming generally
exaggerated, generally correct, generally
underestimated?
Next, I'm going to read a list of problems facing the
country. For each one, please tell me if you personally
worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount,
only a little or not at all? How much do you personally
worry about the quality of the environment?

GallupClimateWorry

April 2000, March: 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, 2015

Gallup
Organization

GallupSeriousness

December: 2000, 2004,
2010, 2013

Gallup
Organization

GallupPersonalWorry

March: 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,
2015

Gallup
Organization
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Which of the following statements reflects your view of
when the effects of global warming will begin to happen
-- they have already begun to happen, they will start
happening within a few years, they will start happening
within your lifetime, they will not happen within your
lifetime, but they will affect future generations (or) they
will never happen?
Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view is
the seriousness of global warming --generally
exaggerated, generally correct or is it generally
underestimated?

GallupGWEffects

March: 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,
2015

Gallup
Organization

GallupGWNews

Gallup
Organization

Just your impression, which one of the following
statements do you think is most accurate -- most
scientists believe that global warming is occurring, most
scientists believe that global warming is NOT occurring
or most scientists are unsure about whether global
warming is occurring or not?
Do you think global warming is an environmental
problem that is causing a serious impact now, or do you
think the impact of global warming won't happen until
sometime in the future, or do you think global warming
won't have a serious impact at all?
Do you think it is necessary to take steps to counter the
effects of global warming right away, or isn't it
necessary to take steps yet?
(As I read a list of possible long-range foreign policy
goals which the United States might have, tell me how
much priority you think each should be given. Do you
think this should have top priority, some priority, or no
priority at all?)... Dealing with global warming
And from what you have heard or read, do you believe
increases in the Earth's temperature over the last century
are due more to -- the effects of pollution from human
activities (or) natural changes in the environment that
are not due to human activities?
There is a controversy over what the countries of the
world, including the US (United States), should do about
the problem of global warming. I'm going to read you
three statements. Please tell me which statements comes
closest to your own point of view....Until we are sure
that global warming, is really a problem we should not
take any steps that would have economic costs. The
problem of global warming should be addressed, but its
effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem
gradually by taking steps that are low in cost. Global
warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should
begin taking steps now even if this involves significant
costs.
Which of the following statements is closest to your
own opinion?...There is a consensus among the great
majority of scientists that global warming exists and
could do significant damage. There is a consensus
among the great majority of scientists that global
warming does not exist and therefore poses no
significant threat. Scientists are divided on the existence
of global warming and its impact.
Global warming is a term used to describe changes in
the temperature of the earth's atmosphere which could
result in changes in the environment. How much have
you heard or read about global warming--a lot, some,
not much or nothing at all?

GallupGWScientists

March: 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,
2015
March 2001, 2006, 2008,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, 2015

USCBSNYT

June 2001, April 2007,
December 2007, April
2010, June 2012, May
2006

CBS News/New
York Times

USCBSNYTT

June 2001 and April 2007

CBS News/New
York Times

USPSRAA

October 2001, August
2004, November 2005

Princeton Survey
Research
Associates
International

GallupGWHumanActs

March: 2003, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014, 2015

Gallup
Organization

USUMARY

June 2004, July 2005

Program On
International
Policy Attitudes,
University of
Maryland

USUMARY1

July 2005, June 2004

Program On
International
Policy Attitudes,
University of
Maryland

USCBSNYTTT

May 2006, April 2007,

CBS News/New
York Times
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Which comes closer to your view?...Global warming is a
very serious problem and should be one of the highest
priorities for government leaders. Global warming is
serious but does not need to be a high priority. Global
warming is not serious and can be addressed years from
now.
Which of the following statements come closest to your
view of global warming?...Global warming is a proven
fact and is mostly caused by emissions from cars and
industrial facilities such as power plants and factories.
Global warming is a proven fact and is mostly caused by
natural changes that have nothing to do with emissions
from cars and industrial facilities. Global warming is a
theory that has not yet been proven.
If nothing is done to reduce global warming in the
future, how serious of a problem do you think it will be
for the world?...Very serious, somewhat serious, not so
serious, not serious at all
Do you think global warming is an environmental
problem that is causing a serious impact now, or do you
think the impact of global warming won't happen until
sometime in the future, or do you think global warming
won't have a serious impact at all?
In your view, is global warming a very serious problem,
somewhat serious, not too serious, or not a problem?
Which statement comes closest to your view about
global warming?...Global warming is caused mostly by
human activity such as burning fossil fuels. Global
warming is caused mostly by natural patterns in the
earth's environment. Global warming does not exist.

USCBSNY

April 2007, December
2009, September 2011

CBS News/New
York Times

USORC

May 2007, June 2008,
December 2009,
September 2011, January
2013

ORC
International

USIPSOSR

June 2007, September
2007

Ipsos-Public
Affairs

USCBS

October 2007, February
2009, August 2010,
October 2010, April 2011,
April 2013

CBS News

USSRBI

May 2008, October 2009

Abt SRBI

USCBSS

October 2012, January
2013, April 2013

CBS News

NOTE: A summary of all the variable data used in the VAR analysis is available in the
“Stata VAR Excelification.xlsx” file in the “Data” tab
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Applying the Model to CCSI
Detailed Information on Variable Sources and Recoding
1. Economic Recessionary Data: 6 measures of economic recession indicators are used in the
thesis. This category of data was easy to find as the St. Louis FRED Economic Research
website hosted all this information and I downloaded quarterly data for the desired time
period (Q1 2000 – Q4 2015). Data can be found at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
2. Partisanship/Political Elite Cues: 6 measures of partisanship were included in the model
and I followed the same steps as Brulle (2012). The sources and recoding information of
these variables is borrowed from Brulle (2012) Supplementary Information since they are
exactly replicated for my thesis:• Congressional action statements on climate change issued by Republicans and
Democrats identified by a keyword search of Lexis-Nexis Congressional (Sellers 2010:
79-80). Each statement was coded as either supporting, opposing, or neutral regarding
Congressional legislative action to address climate change.
• Number of Congressional hearings on climate change reported in the Proquest
Congressional Data Base (3/1/2019) under "Global Climate Change," "Greenhouse
Effect," “CO2” and "Carbon Dioxide."
• Senate and House roll call votes on climate change bills identified in the League of
Conservation Voters National Environmental Scorecard (see Lindaman and HaiderMarkel 2002: 97). Data can be found online at: http://scorecard.lcv.org/scorecard?year=all
3. Controls – Extreme Weather Data: 4 measures of extreme weather as measured by drought
levels, percentage of warm and cold areas, and an overall extreme weather index were
compiled using the same strategy suggested by Brulle (2012). The recoding description is
again borrowed from Brulle (2012) Supplementary Information:• Overall Climate Extremes Index – arithmetic average of six indicators of climatic
extremes across the U.S. Data can be found online at:
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/extremes/cei/graph

• Extremes in Maximum Temperature % of U.S. with maximum temperatures much
above normal. Data can be found online at: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/temp-andprecip/uspa/
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• Drought Levels - % of U.S. in severe drought based on the Palmer Drought Severity
Index. Data can be found online at:
https://www.drought.gov/drought/search/data?f%5B0%5D=field_data_coverage%3A157

4. Controls - Media Coverage & Advocacy: 3 measures of media coverage and advocacy
were built using strategies recommended in Brulle (2012). The recoding information and
description are partly borrowed from Brulle (2012) Supplementary Information:
•

The Media Coverage Index is an additive index (alpha=0.649) used to represent
media coverage on climate change. The Index is based on three types of media
sources (TV, Newspaper, & Magazines):
o Number of stories on climate change on the nightly news shows of the major
broadcast TV networks (NBC, CBS, ABC) based on a Boolean keyword
search of the Vanderbilt Television Archives using "global warming," "climate
change," “greenhouse” and "sea level". Data can be found online at:
https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/

o Number of stories on climate change in the New York Times - The count of
stories on climate change in the NY Times was collected by a Lexis-Nexis
Academic Search using the same set of keywords as above.
o Number of stories on climate change in the three major weekly magazine
stories (Newsweek, Time, and USA Today) - gathered using “Readers' Guide
Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson)”, access provided by DePauw libraries. The
search was again made using the following terms: "climate change" or "global
warming" or greenhouse or "atmospheric carbon dioxide".
•

Number of stories on climate change in 7 major environmental magazines (listed
below) - gathered from “Readers' Guide Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson)”, access
provided by DePauw libraries. Search was made using the following terms: "climate
change" or "global warming" or greenhouse or "atmospheric carbon dioxide". The 7
environmental magazines are: American Forests, E: The Environmental Magazine,
Environment, National Parks, Oceanus, Sierra, and The Mother Earth News.

•

Number of stories on climate change in 4 major conservative (listed below) - gathered
from “Readers' Guide Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson)”. Search was made on the
following terms: "climate change" or "global warming" or greenhouse or
"atmospheric carbon dioxide". The magazines are: Human Events, National Review,
Reason, and The American Spectator.
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5. Controls - Scientific Information: 2 measures of scientific information were used based
on recommendations from Brulle (2012) again. These are:
•

Count of articles in different types of scientific outlets including: Magazines,
Academic Journals, Biographies, and Peer-Reviewed Articles. The search phrases
used were: “global warming” OR “climate change” OR greenhouse”. Used the
same source as Media advocacy: Reader's Guide Full Text Select (H.W. Wilson).

•

Release of major climate change assessment reports - The release of major climate
change assessment reports scored as a dummy variable (yes = 1) for the quarters
in which a report was released. The following reports were included: 1)
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Reports (varies years), 2) US
Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), and 3) the America’s Climate
Choices report released by the NRC. Data for IPCC can be found at:
https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/. Data for the other two can be found at:
https://www.globalchange.gov/browse/reports?f%5B0%5D=field_report_organiza
tion%3A175

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2019

93

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 16 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 9

Data Analysis
These are all the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for both Model 1 and Model 2
given by Stata. The commands for these tests are available in the associated Do-Files.

Figure S1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for
Model 1
*not showing ADF tests at first differences for
nonstationary variables
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Figure S2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for
Model 2
*not showing ADF tests at first differences for
nonstationary variables
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Resources and Additional Information
Disclaimer: All the knowledge shared about the Vector Autoregression is self-taught using
the Applied Econometric Time Series (4th Edition) book by Walter Enders (2011), several
journal articles, and some really helpful videos by Ben Lambert.
DGP: Vector Autoregression – Pre-estimation Steps
Unit Root Process: Detailed scholarly information about the unit root process can be found
on Enders (2011) – Chapter 4 (Models with Trend), Unit Roots and Regression Residuals
(Unit 3).
For those seeking for a quick intuitive explanation of the Dickey Fuller test for unit root,
please refer to Lambert (2013) video: “Dickey Fuller Test for Unit Root”
https://youtu.be/2GxWgIumPTA.
Optimal Lag Length Tests: Again, detailed information and a discussion of the optimal
model selction criterion to render parsimonious models is provided by Enders (2011) on page
69, in the Model Selection Criteria subsection of the chapter, “Sample Autocorrelation of
Stationary Series”.
Again, a shorter visual discussion of these methods are discussed in this 11-minute video by
Lambert (2013): “Evaluating model fit through AIC, DIC, WAIC, and LOO-CV.
https://youtu.be/xS4jDHQfP2o
DGP: Vector Autoregression – Post-estimation Steps
Wald Test: Lambert (2013) provides a short, under 7-minute, introduction to the Wald test
for those interested in learning more about it. See the video: https://youtu.be/TFKbyXAfr1M
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